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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this Article is to explore, and explain the stubborn per-
sistence of, a central paradox that is endemic to the retail Islamic bank as 
it operates in the United States. The paradox is that retail Islamic banking 
in the United States is impossible, and yet it remains highly desired. It is 
impossible because central features of modern banking regulation conflict 
with fundamental aspects of shari’a as it is understood in modernity in the 
context of finance. It is unimaginable that regulators will create exceptions 
to, or somehow significantly amend, the modern financial regulatory system 
in the radical fashion necessary to accommodate Islamic finance. Yet not-
withstanding such impossibility, Islamic banking is also highly desired in 
that there is a preoccupation with finding a way to enhance the very limited 
Islamic commercial banking opportunities that exist in the United States.  
The paradox endures because the Islamic bank, and the accommodation 
of it within the U.S. regulatory sphere, is a powerful symbol for the accom-
modation of the broader, pious Muslim public. The pious Muslim eager to 
see an Islamic bank open in her neighborhood is at best only partly interested 
in adherence to religious doctrine. The Islamic bank is more importantly a 
reflection of a broader recognition of her space in the American fabric.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this Article is to explore, and explain the stubborn per-
sistence of, a central paradox that is endemic to the retail Islamic bank as 
it operates in the United States. The paradox is that retail Islamic banking 
in the United States is impossible, and yet it remains highly desired.1 The 
reason for its persistence is that the desire to see Islamic banking expand in 
the United States stems from the strong desire to accommodate Muslims in 
the broader American fabric, and acknowledging its doctrinal impossibility 
would seem directly contrary to that strong and salutary impulse. Hence, the 
impossibility is ignored, and the paradox remains. 
To be clear, I do not mean the bank is “impossible” in the sense that an 
institution holding some sort of banking charter and claiming to be “Islamic” 
could not possibly exist—some already do, albeit to a very limited extent.2 I 
mean instead that an institution claiming to be an American Islamic retail 
bank violates on a regular basis core aspects of shari’a3 (at least as shari’a 
                                                                                                                         
1 See infra notes 2–10 and accompanying text. 
2 See infra Part II.E.  
3 I use the term shari’a herein to refer to the corpus of extensive, overlapping and oft-
conflicting rules developed by Muslim jurists, medieval and modern, from Islam’s sacred 
foundational texts, the Qur’an, as revealed word of God, and the Hadith, or statements, 
utterances, and actions of the Prophet Muhammad. I am often intelligently and thought-
fully criticized for defining this vast and contradictory body of norms and rules developed 
by medieval jurists as shari’a, rather than fiqh. See, e.g., Patrick S. O’Donnell, Divine Law 
(Shari’ah) and Jurisprudence (Fiqh) in Islam, RATIO JURIS: LAW, POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY 
(June 26, 2009, 10:58 AM), http://ratiojuris.blogspot.com/2009/06/divine-law-shariah-juris 
prudence-fiqh.html. It is true that the latter term is often used to describe the substantive rules 
derived by jurists while the shari’a conveys a more idealistic sensibility. See FRANK E. 
VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES, III, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK AND RETURN 
23–24 (1998) (distinguishing between shari’a as the immutable Divine Law and fiqh as 
human efforts to capture that law through scholarly interpretation); Asifa Quraishi, What 
if Shari’a Weren’t the Enemy?: Rethinking International Women’s Rights Advocacy on 
Islamic Law, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 173, 203 (2011) (noting a similar distinction). The 
problem is that if shari’a refers to nothing beyond a perfect and immutable Divine Law 
separate and apart from any human effort to understand that law, then almost as a matter of 
epistemological necessity it means precisely nothing that is of value to lawyers. Moreover, 
if shari’a were truly divorced from human understanding of Divine Law, it would render 
clauses like the one contained in Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution declaring “the princi-
ples of the shari’a” to be “the principal source of legislation” entirely baffling. CONSTITUTION 
OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980; see Jill I. 
Goldenziel, Veiled Political Questions: Islamic Dress, Constitutionalism, and the Ascend-
ance of Courts, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 17 (2013) (describing the content of Article 2 of the 
Egyptian Constitution). Hence I find my definition, while contestable, more appropriate 
under the circumstances. 
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is understood within the industry)4 because fundamental and indispensable 
parts of United States banking regulation require as much.5   
Notwithstanding such impossibility, Islamic banking is also highly de-
sired in that there is a preoccupation—an obsession one might say—with 
finding a way to enhance the very limited Islamic commercial banking 
opportunities that exist in the United States. Law review articles,6 govern-
ment issued policy reports,7 trade publications,8 and Islamic finance outlets 
themselves9 have discussed—and in some cases advanced—such initiatives 
at one time or another. Unsurprisingly, these have led largely nowhere because, 
                                                                                                                         
4 I do not claim the derivations of shari’a put forth by modern clerics respecting core 
Islamic prohibitions in commerce and finance are the only plausible interpretations of 
Islam’s sacred texts that can be developed in those fields. In fact, in earlier work, I pointed 
to contrary interpretations that are plausible. Haider Ala Hamoudi, Muhammad’s Social 
Justice or Muslim Cant?: Langdellianism and the Future of Islamic Finance, 40 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 89, 128–30 (2007) (describing efforts by Arab jurist Abdul Razzaq al-
Sanhuri to cast the traditional Islamic prohibition on riba as only tangentially concerned 
with lending money at interest). The point here, however, is that whether or not other plau-
sible interpretations of shari’a exist, Islamic finance as an industry has developed its own 
specific set of prohibitions from the shari’a. Any financial institution purporting to act as a 
retail bank in the United States would necessarily be in violation of more than a few of them, 
several of which are quite central. Given that an Islamic bank could not credibly disregard 
broad industry consensus respecting what the shari’a does and does not allow in favor of 
its own (self-serving) interpretations, this presents a rather serious problem.  
5 See infra Part II (exploring this in detail). 
6 Roberta Mann, Is Sharif’s Castle Deductible: Islam and the Tax Treatment of Mortgage 
Debt, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1139, 1166–69 (2009). There are also a number of 
well-written law review notes that argue in favor of regulatory adjustment to accommodate 
Islamic finance. See generally Sulman A. Bhatti, Note, The Shari’ah and the Challenge 
and Opportunity of Embracing Finance “Without Interest,” 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
205, 207 (2010); Mushfique Shams Billah, Comment, Arab Money: Why Isn’t the United 
States Getting Any?, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1055, 1058 (2011); Kyle Gaffaney, Student Article, 
Buying a Home Can Be Difficult for Muslims in the United States, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. 
REV. 557, 565 (2009). 
7 Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Exec. Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bank of 
N.Y., Speech Before the Seminar on Legal Issues in the Islamic Financial Services Industry: 
Regulation of Islamic Financial Services in the United States (Mar. 2, 2005), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2005/bax050302.html; SHAYERAH ILIAS, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22931, ISLAMIC FINANCE: OVERVIEW AND POLICY CONCERNS 
8 (2010); Shirley Chiu et al., Islamic Finance in the United States: A Small but Growing 
Industry, CHI. FED. LETTER No. 214 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi.), May 2005, available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/chicago_fed_letter/2005/cflmay2005 
_214.pdf. 
8 See, e.g., Vikram Modi, Writing the Rules: The Need for Standardized Regulation of 
Islamic Finance, 29 HARV. INT’L REV. 38, 41 (Spring 2007). 
9 See, e.g., Abdi Shayesteh, Islamic Banks in the United States: Breaking Through the 
Barriers, NEWHORIZON, Apr.–June 2009, at 1. 
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as noted above, the project is an impossibility. There is no credible shari’a 
compliant banking institution to facilitate. Instead, there are only com-
promises to be made, inevitably on the side of the Islamic bank, and plain 
shari’a violations to endure.10 
If this is so, and the next two Parts of the Article will be devoted to 
demonstrating that it is, then it is worth investigating why there is such in-
terest in Islamic retail banking. Regulators could, after all, figuratively shrug 
their shoulders and inform Islamic banking enthusiasts that American law and 
regulation can no more accommodate the practice of Islamic banking than 
it can accommodate a group of people who refuse to pay income taxes for 
purportedly religious reasons.11 Islamic banking enthusiasts could see the 
reality for what it is, resign themselves to the current state of affairs, and give 
up on an Islamic bank, at least in the short to medium term, given the funda-
mental incompatibilities it presents to American regulation. Instead there is 
the endless repetition of a charade, where one side pretends to care about 
accommodation, and the other pretends to find a way to work within accom-
modations provided, when it is perfectly clear that on the plains of doctrine, 
the two sides cannot possibly meet. 
In fact, there is ample reason the efforts continue.12 But to understand 
it, we must look beyond the legal doctrine underlying Islamic retail banking 
on the one hand, and American regulation of financial institutions on the 
other. In fact, the matter has relatively little to do with the niceties of bank-
ing regulation on its own terms, Islamic or American. Instead, the bank, and 
the accommodation of it within the U.S. regulatory sphere, merely represents 
a symbol for the accommodation of the broader, pious Muslim public.13 
                                                                                                                         
10 See McKean James Evans, Note, The Future of Conflict Between Islamic and Western 
Financial Systems: Profit, Principle and Pragmatism, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 819, 820 (2010) 
(predicting that “accommodations made by Western systems will be primarily formalistic, 
while the compromises made by the Islamic system will come mainly from principle.”). 
11 Numerous individuals have claimed, and continue to claim, that the payment of income 
taxes violates their religious conscience and therefore applying the tax laws to them is a vio-
lation of the Free Exercise Clause, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (West 2013). Courts 
invariably reject such claims because of the compelling government interest in “maintain-
ing a sound tax system, free of myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious 
beliefs.” Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699–700 (1989) (citations omitted). See also 
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1982) (stating the same with respect to social 
security taxes); Jenkins v. Comm’r, 483 F.3d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting a similar claim 
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). The governmental interests in maintaining a 
sound financial system are surely no less strong, particularly following the financial crisis 
that began with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. 
12 See infra Part II.E. 
13 See infra Part III.A. 
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The pious Muslim, eager to see an Islamic bank open in her neighbor-
hood, earn a national charter, and offer products and services, including de-
mand deposit services, is at best only partly interested in adherence to religious 
doctrine. At the very least, with the slightest bit of inspection, that Muslim 
will surely discover practices at stark variance with some of the core rules 
of Islamic finance and almost in direct opposition to the purported principles 
of the practice.14 Yet, the Muslim remains eager because the Islamic bank 
is a reflection of a broader recognition of her space in the broader American 
fabric.15 Her religion is not only recognized, but her financial practices are 
respected and indeed legitimized by the relevant American legal and regu-
latory regime. She is, in this sense, comfortable being both thoroughly 
American and thoroughly Muslim. 
As for American regulators and most policymakers, part of the nation’s 
elite, they instinctually prefer messages of inclusion to those that appear 
xenophobic or intolerant, and they are predisposed to help find a way to ac-
commodate this broad Muslim desire.16 Hence, members of the Department 
of the Treasury assure us in remarks and publications that such efforts at ac-
commodation are underway.17 Federal regulators regularly appear at Islamic 
finance conferences.18 Several participated in a workshop sponsored by the 
Islamic Finance Project of Harvard Law School in 2004 dedicated specifi-
cally to discussing regulatory concerns, and the keynote speaker was the 
Undersecretary for the Treasury.19 In 2005, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York sponsored a conference in Kuwait City on a similar topic.20 In 
2008, the Department of Treasury sponsored a seminar in Washington, DC 
entitled “Islamic Finance 101.”21 In addition to scheduling and attending all 
of these conferences, in 2004, the Department of the Treasury initiated a 
“scholar in residence” program to help the Department better understand 
Islamic finance and named its first scholar in residence.22 
                                                                                                                         
14 See infra Part III.A. 
15 See infra Part III.A.  
16 See infra Part III.A. 
17 See Baxter, supra note 7, at 1–3; Chiu et al., supra note 7, at 3–4. 
18 It is rare for any Islamic finance conference or seminar in the United States, among 
the many that I have attended, not to have a speaker on a panel who serves in some regu-
latory capacity in the federal government. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 7, at 2. 
19 Program of Sixth Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance, ISLAMIC FINANCE 
PROJECT OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, ifp.law.harvard.edu/login/view_pdf/?file=forum6th 
.pdf&type=forums (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) [hereinafter Program]. 
20 William L. Rutledge, Exec. Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at 
the 2005 Arab Bankers Association of North America (ABANA) Conference on Islamic 
Finance: Players, Products & Innovations in New York City (Apr. 19, 2005), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2005/rut050422.html. 
21 Shayesteh, supra note 9, at 2. 
22 Baxter, supra note 7, at 2. For reasons that are somewhat unclear, the Department of 
the Treasury selected as its first scholar in residence, Mahmoud El-Gamal, a critic of Islamic 
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The purpose of all of this engagement—undertaken under both Demo-
cratic and Republican administrations—is hardly to develop useful consen-
sual solutions to outstanding regulatory concerns. The Department does not 
need a “scholar in residence”23 or an “Islamic Finance 101” seminar to do 
that.24 It surely is aware of the premier regulatory issues and obstacles. If its 
staff did not learn them sufficiently at the Islamic Finance Project seminar 
in Harvard Law School in 2004,25 in New York City in 2005,26 or at the 
Islamic Finance 101 conference in 2009,27 it is hard to imagine they will 
learn them now. In any event, as explored further below, it really matters 
little what the Treasury Department actually knows about Islamic finance. 
This is because it is perfectly clear that accommodating an Islamic bank is 
impossible, doctrinally unthinkable given the central purposes of banking 
regulation in the United States. 
Rather, dialogue and engagement help to demonstrate something else; 
namely, that the government is determined to help to find space for the 
pious Muslim in the United States, respectful of the pious Muslim’s reli-
gious commitments and aware of the Muslim’s ability to function both as 
Muslim and as American simultaneously. Thus, the dialogue and engagement 
for the most part occurred after September 11, 2001, when the position of 
Muslims in the United States was the most vulnerable. Yet, by that time, the 
Department of the Treasury had already made the major substantive accom-
modations it was willing to make to integrate Islamic finance into the rubric 
of American banking regulations. This was done in the form of two interpretive 
letters issued by its Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), in 
1997 and 1999, respectively.28 In other words, the actual accommodations 
preceded the dialogue and the engagement precisely because the govern-
ment was not engaging in dialogue in order to overcome remaining obstacles 
through some sort of further accommodation, but rather to demonstrate a 
desire to integrate Muslims into the broader American fabric.29 
                                                                                                                         
finance so severe that he describes existing Islamic finance practices as being a form of 
“shari’a arbitrage” and compares the collection of the fees and expenses gathered by those 
that design and bless shari’a compliant transactions to the medieval practices of selling in-
dulgences. MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW, ECONOMICS AND PRACTICE 
1 (2006). 
23 See Baxter, supra note 7, at 2.  
24 See Shayesteh, supra note 9, at 2. 
25 Program, supra note 19. 
26 Rutledge, supra note 20. 
27 Shayesteh, supra note 9, at 2. 
28 See Rutledge, supra note 20. The interpretive letters are also discussed in greater de-
tail in the next section. 
29 See id. 
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The symbolic power of Islamic finance as a form of welcoming a Muslim 
presence in the United States is not lost on those who view the growing 
Muslim presence on American soil as some sort of existential threat. Thus, 
just as there are efforts at accommodation on the part of executive officials, 
there has also been a widespread, sustained and multipronged attack on 
Islamic finance, precisely on the (erroneous and in fact inane) grounds it helps 
to fund terrorism and jihadism and otherwise threatens American security.30 
                                                                                                                         
30 This is very much an effort directed at Muslim exclusion. Islamophobic elements, 
for example, began a well-nigh incoherent campaign to remove halal meat from stores in 
France. Dale Hurd, Muslim Halal Food Sales Supporting Terrorism?, CBN NEWS (Jan. 9, 
2011), http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2011/January/Muslim-Halal-Food-Sales-Sup 
porting-Terrorism/. The effort might be deemed quixotic, but, more successfully, in the 
state of Oklahoma, a state amendment to the constitution was passed that read in relevant 
part as follows: 
The Courts [in] exercising their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere 
to the law as provided in the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma 
Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations promulgated 
pursuant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and 
rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of another 
state of the United States provided the law of the other state does not 
include Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions. The courts shall not look 
to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts 
shall not consider international law or Sharia Law. The provisions of this 
subsection shall apply to all cases before the respective courts including, 
but not limited to, cases of first impression. 
The Tenth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction against implementation of the amend-
ment on the grounds that the amendment is in violation of the Establishment Clause. Awad 
v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 2012). The Western District of Oklahoma then 
entered a permanent injunction in August of 2013 on the same grounds. Awad v. Ziriax, 
No. CIV-10-1186-M, 2013 WL 4441476 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 15, 2013). For an excellent and 
thorough discussion of the amendment and its potential implications concerning shari’a, 
international law, and the conflict of laws, see generally John T. Parry, Oklahoma’s Save 
Our State Amendment and the Conflict of Laws, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
Other legislative efforts exist as well, including Tennessee’s proposed anti-shari’a 
measure. This bill defines a shari’a organization as two or more persons practicing shari’a, 
defines shari’a as rules “emanat[ing] directly or indirectly from the god of Allah and the 
Prophet Mohammed,” and indicates that to offer material support to a shari’a organization 
designated by the Attorney General as having a terrorist intent is a felony carrying a 15 year 
minimum prison sentence. S.B. 1028, 107th Leg. (Tenn. 2011), §§ 39-13-904(1)-(2), 39-
13-906(a)(1)(B). Because the primary sources of Islam encompass rules of worship, such as 
prayer, this means that a shari’a organization is any two individuals who gather for group 
prayers whom the Attorney General decides have terrorist intent. N. J. COULSON, A HISTORY 
OF ISLAMIC LAW 12 (1964). To offer these individuals a place to pray would then, under this 
bill, constitute a felony punishable by a minimum of fifteen years in prison. Unsurprisingly, 
few Muslims find comfort in the bill’s simultaneous assurance that it “neither targets, nor 
incidentally prohibits or inhibits, the peaceful practice of any religion, and in particular, the 
practice of Islam by its adherents.” S.B. 1028, 107th Leg. (Tenn. 2011) § 39-13-903(4). 
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Just as the hopeless and impossible-to-satisfy efforts to accommodate Islamic 
banking arise more out of a wellspring of tolerance and inclusion, so the ef-
forts to end all forms of Islamic finance arise more out of a desire to exclude 
Muslims than they do out of any reasonably articulated doctrinal objection 
to Islamic finance per se.31 
There are broader lessons we can glean from the story of Islamic banking 
in America. One important lesson concerns the surprising resilience and indeed 
expansion of Islamic finance across the globe. It is no secret that the global 
Islamic finance industry has made significant compromises of its own. Many 
commentators have pointed out that it has departed from its own idealistic 
visions to achieve something that looks more like a mimicry of conventional 
finance to comply with narrow and highly formalistic prohibitions.32 This 
criticism has become something of a mainstay in conferences devoted to 
Islamic finance and in discussions about the practice.33 Despite the extensive 
                                                                                                                         
Finally, of course, there are the efforts to prohibit mosque buildings in various parts 
of the United States. The media explosion surrounding the building of a so-called “Ground 
Zero Mosque”—in fact a Muslim community center several blocks away from the site of the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001—is well known. See Robert Farley, Fact Checking 
the ‘Ground Zero Mosque’ Debate, POLITIFACT (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.politifact.com 
/truth-o-meter/article/2010/aug/20/fact-checking-ground-zero-mosque-debate/. Less well known 
is the opposition that greets proposed mosque-building projects as far from Ground Zero 
as Murfreesboro, Tennessee. Robbie Brown & Christine Hauser, After a Struggle, Mosque 
Opens in Tennessee, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/us 
/islamic-center-of-murfreesboro-opens-in-tennessee.html. In addition, one member of Con-
gress has declared that America already has “too many mosques” and 85 percent of the 
existing mosques are controlled by extremists. Rep. Peter King: There are ‘too many 
mosques in this country,’ POLITICO (Sept. 19, 2007, 7:22 PM), http://www.politico.com 
/blogs/thecrypt/0907/Rep_King_There_are_too_many_mosques_in_this_country_.html. 
31 See infra Part III.B. 
32 See, e.g., Hamoudi, supra note 4, at 94 (“Proponents of Islamic finance often repeat ... 
functional objectives of fairness and social justice, but do not employ appropriate methodo-
logical techniques to achieve these goals.”); Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, “Interest” and the 
Paradox of Contemporary Islamic Law and Finance, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 108, 127 
(2003) (“On the assets side, Islamic banks avoid the risks of profit and loss—sharing invest-
ment arrangements by engaging mostly in cost—plus trading and lease financing .... [B]oth 
forms of finance mimic conventional bank financing to a very high degree, with few tech-
nical details.”); Nazim Zaman & Mehmet Asutay, Divergence Between Aspirations and 
Realities of Islamic Economics: A Political Economy Approach to Bridging the Divide, 
17 IIUM J. ECON. & MGMT. 73, 74 (2009) (“[T]he Islamic banking and finance (IBF) 
industry ... unfortunately has not realized the goals and aspirations put forward by the pio-
neers in the 1960s and early 1970s. Rather, the ... industry seems to have grown as part of 
the conventional financial sector in the global capitalist economy.”). 
33 Zubair Hasan, Islamic Banking at the Crossroads: Theory Versus Practice, in 
ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON WEALTH CREATION 11 (Munawar Iqbal & Rodney Wilson eds., 
2005); Zaman & Asutay, supra note 32, at 74. 
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dialogue and expressions of concern both within and outside the industry, 
the practice has not changed,34 and more importantly, it has not needed to. 
The practice is quite capable of expanding at dizzying rates using almost ex-
clusively narrow and formalistic techniques that even widely respected pro-
ponents of the practice do not defend with any degree of vigor.35 
This is another riddle, one that is related to the paradox concerning the 
mystifying interest in the impossible American Islamic bank.  One might 
expect less interest in Islamic finance as it grew increasingly narrow, formal-
istic and mimicking.  Specifically, to quote one prominent Islamic scholar 
who is a leader in the industry, the fear would be that “[i]f the system does 
not make significant progress” in realizing its own articulated vision of what 
Islamic finance is supposed to achieve, “it will lose credibility in the eyes of 
the Muslim masses and the rapid progress that it has been making may not 
be sustainable.”36 That statement was made in 2008, when Islamic finance 
was estimated to involve $500 billion in assets.37 An Ernst & Young report 
suggested at the end of 2012 that in 2013, Islamic finance would surpass the 
$1.8 trillion mark.38 The resilience demands explanation, and extralegal 
considerations of the sort discussed in the context of the American Islamic 
bank help to explain it. 
Part I of this Article discusses in greater detail the practice of Islamic 
finance, and outlines its vision of profit and loss sharing. This Part also de-
scribes the broad deviation from the ideal practice that generally occurs irre-
spective of regulatory obstacles. Part II sets forth precisely why American laws 
and regulations not only render the ideal vision unrealistic, but also would 
force fairly central violations of shari’a onto an Islamic bank, thereby making 
it impossible to credibly claim that it is a shari’a compliant institution. Hav-
ing demonstrated the impossibility of the Islamic banking enterprise, Part III 
offers an alternative explanation for the broad Muslim desire for more Islamic 
banking in the United States and the reason the Department of the Treasury 
has gone through such great efforts to engage with it to no obvious fruitful 
                                                                                                                         
34 See, e.g., MUFTI MUHAMMAD TAQI USMANI, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FINANCE 
161–69 (2d ed. 2008) (expressing dismay at the failure of Islamic banks to adhere to the prin-
ciples of Islamic finance as they expand). See generally M. Umer Chapra, Speech at Eighth 
Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance: Innovation and Authenticity 11–14 (Apr. 19, 
2008), http://ifp.law.harvard.edu/login/view_pdf/?file=Ummer_Chapra.pdf&type=forums. 
35 Chapra, supra note 34, at 11–14 (describing the respective positions of Usmani and 
Chapra on some of the artifices used to evade core shari’a prohibitions). 
36 Id. at 12. 
37 Isam Salah, Islamic Finance in the Current Financial Crisis, 2 BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E. 
& ISLAMIC L. 137, 138 (2009) (citing a study and projection undertaken by Moody’s in 2008). 
38 International Connectivity Vital for Further Growth of the Islamic Banking Industry, 
BAHRAINI NEWS AGENCY (May 20, 2013, 3:04 PM), http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news 
/561535 [hereinafter Future Growth]. 
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end. This is a quest for greater Muslim belonging, a sentiment on both sides 
to seek Muslim inclusion in the broader national fabric. This Part also shows 
the manner in which opposition to Islamic finance in the United States is 
better understood as an effort to exclude and isolate Muslims than as any 
sort of principled objection to the practice on its own terms. Finally, the 
Conclusion presents summary thoughts on why taking account of extra-
doctrinal considerations, of the sort explored in this Article not only sheds 
light on why there is such interest in Islamic banking in the United States, 
but also why Islamic finance continues to expand at such dizzying speeds 
globally, notwithstanding its own compromises. 
I. PROFIT AND LOSS SHARING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
It is quite difficult to find an account of Islamic banking—whether in an 
academic publication, a trade journal or a newspaper article—that does not at 
least start with the canard that Islamic finance relies upon the principle of 
profit and loss sharing, strictly forbidding the interest-based return on which 
conventional banks rely.39 Hence, early Islamic finance advocates posited 
the ideal form of the Islamic bank as a two-tiered silent partnership.40 At the 
lowest end of the system were the portfolio investments, where a bank, as 
“silent partner,” supplied necessary finance and an entrepreneur did the nec-
essary labor, thereby justifying an agreed upon division of profits and losses 
for each of them based on a ratio they set between themselves.41 Then, as the 
ventures made (or lost) money, the bank’s portion of the profits (or losses) 
generated would be funneled through the bank and its depositors.42 In this 
second silent partnership, it is the bank effectively doing the labor vis-a-vis 
the depositors, who are the silent partners.43 
                                                                                                                         
39 For representative examples of this, see ABDULLAH SAEED, ISLAMIC BANKING AND 
INTEREST 1 (2d ed. 1999) (“The theory of Islamic banking ... maintains that Islamic banking 
is interest-free banking based on the concepts of mudraba and mushraka, that is, Profit 
and Loss Sharing (PLS).”); USMANI, supra note 34, at 27–28; Abbas Mirakhor & Iqbal 
Zaidi, Profit-and-Loss Sharing Contracts in Islamic Finance, in HANDBOOK OF ISLAMIC 
BANKING 49 (Hassan & Lewis eds., 2007) (“The main difference between an Islamic or 
interest-free banking system and the conventional interest-based banking system is that, under 
the latter, the profit is fixed in advance or is a simple linear function of some other bench-
mark rate, whereas, in the former, the profits and losses on a physical investment are shared 
between the creditor and the borrower according to a formula that reflects their respective 
levels of participation.”); Chiu et al., supra note 7, at 1 (indicating that Islamic finance “is 
based on a profit and loss structure rather than a lender-borrower arrangement”). 
40 VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 3, at 130–31. 
41 Id. at 129–30. 
42 Id. at 130. 
43 Id. at 130–31. 
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At the portfolio level, this is in sharp contradistinction to conventional 
loans, which involve an obligation to pay back the lender an additional 
amount corresponding to interest irrespective of the extent to which the bor-
rower has profited or lost money from the underlying enterprise. Islamic 
finance sharply decries such a practice, declaring interest in all forms to be 
absolutely prohibited under the shari’a.44 The chief justification for this in-
terest ban offered by Islamic finance advocates is precisely that lending at 
interest does not call for sharing in gains and losses, but rather requires one 
party to bear the losses even as the other earns profit.45 
A sample bank portfolio might then involve, for example, credit offered 
to homeowners to fund the purchase of homes. However, where in conven-
tional finance the bank would simply loan the money to a homeowner and 
expect repayment at interest, in an Islamic system, the bank and the putative 
homeowner would buy the home together.46 When the home was sold, they 
would then share in the profits or losses from the sale, as the case may 
be.47 Hence, if the home was purchased for $100,000, with the homeowner 
supplying a down payment of $10,000, then rather than the bank lending the 
$90,000 balance, it would own 90 percent of the home. If the home were 
instantaneously resold, profits or losses would be divided between the home-
owner and bank based on their respective ownership percentages.48 
Of course, in most situations, the parties do not immediately resell the 
home because the point of the transaction was not speculation but because 
the homeowner wanted to live in the home. In such circumstances, the home-
owner would be living in a house that the bank primarily paid for. Obviously, 
the bank, whether Islamic or otherwise, is a profit making institution and 
                                                                                                                         
44 MUHAMMAD NEJATULLAH SIDDIQI, BANKING WITHOUT INTEREST 7 (1983) (describ-
ing the position permitting some forms of interest as “defeatist”); SAEED, supra note 39, at 
50 (describing this position prohibiting interest as “dominant” and “the basis of Islamic 
banking theory as well as practice.”); Muhammad Uzair, Impact of Interest Free Banking, 3 
J. ISLAMIC BANKING & FIN. 39, 40 (1984) (“By this time, there is a complete consensus of 
all ... schools ... and among Islamic economists, that interest in all forms, of all kinds, and for 
all purposes is completely prohibited in Islam. Gone are the days when people were apol-
ogetic about Islam and contended that the interest for commercial and business purposes, 
as presently charged by banks, was not prohibited by Islam.”). 
45 Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Muezzin’s Call and the Dow Jones Bell: On the Necessity 
of Realism in the Study of Islamic Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 423, 456–58 (2008). 
46 Id. 
47 Id.  
48 Technically, this arrangement would not be a mudaraba, or silent partnership, where 
one party supplies the labor and the other the capital, as would be the case, for example, if a 
bank supplied capital to a chef to open a restaurant. Rather, it is a musharaka, because each 
party contributes capital to the enterprise. USMANI, supra note 34, at 47 (describing the 
distinction between mudaraba and musharaka). 
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is therefore hardly in the business of offering its customers free housing in-
definitely. Thus, as part of the overall transaction, the homeowner would 
have to agree to pay rent for the privilege of living in the home, with the 
proceeds of such rent accruing partially to the homeowner and partially to 
the bank based on their respective ownership proportions.49 In other words, 
if the parties set the rent to the homeowner at $1,000 a month, then $900 of 
it would run to the bank, and $100 would belong to the homeowner because 
the homeowner owns 10 percent of the house. That portion of the rent ac-
cruing to the bank is profit to the bank, to be shared with its depositors based 
on the sharing percentages to which they agreed.50 The balance of the rent is 
also paid over to the bank by the homeowner for the purpose of purchasing a 
very small ownership stake from the bank. Thus, after one monthly payment, 
the homeowner has paid $900 in rent to the bank and purchased a $100 
ownership stake, or .1 percent of the value of the home, so that its ownership 
stake is now 10.1 percent and the bank’s is the balance, or 89.9 percent. 
Over time, as the ownership percentage of the homeowner increases, 
the homeowner uses more of the monthly payment to purchase an owner-
ship percentage, and less profit is thus given to the bank (and derivatively, its 
depositors). To see why this is so, assume after some number of monthly pay-
ments, the homeowner’s ownership percentage in the home has increased 
from 10 percent to 20 percent. At this point, if the rent remains $1,000, then 
only $800 is due the bank because it only owns 80 percent of the home, and 
the remaining $200 is directed to home purchase, meaning the monthly 
payment now secures a .2 percent increase in the homeowner’s ownership 
percentage. Eventually in such a case, over the course of some number of 
years, the homeowner will own the home outright. By adjusting the rent 
figures, it would not be difficult for the parties to fix that term as the same 
thirty years used in conventional mortgages.51 
At a superficial level, this seems to resemble a conventional mortgage in 
many ways. The homeowner pays a set amount for thirty years and at the end 
owns the home clear of any cloud on the title. However, there are quite 
significant differences with conventional finance given the bank’s continu-
ing ownership of part of the home. For one thing, the bank would have a 
strong interest in insuring a suitable resale price of the home. After all, if the 
$100,000 home rose in value to $150,000 and it was sold, the bank would 
share in the $50,000 profit based on its percentage ownership. Likewise, if 
                                                                                                                         
49 VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 3, at 138–39. 
50 In Islamic parlance, such a leasing arrangement is referred to as an ijara. See id. at 9. 
51 This entire transaction is referred to as a “diminishing musharaka” because of the 
reduction and ultimate elimination of the bank’s ownership share as the homeowner pur-
chases it. See Mann, supra note 6, at 1150. 
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the property dropped in value to $50,000, and the parties chose to sell the 
home, they would likewise share in the loss of $50,000 at the same rate. 
Moreover, those same profits and losses funnel through to the depositors 
in the bank. Let us assume the bank shares profits and losses with its bor-
rowers such that its borrowers collectively receive half of the profits and 
losses in the joint venture, with the bank receiving the other half. In that 
case, the sale of the home for $150,000 would lead to the bank’s total gain 
of $45,000 (assuming it owned 90 percent of the home at the time of sale). 
This gain would be shared equally by the bank, which would receive 
$22,500, and its depositors, who would collectively receive $22,500 as well, 
divided pro rata based on the size of their deposits. If the house were sold 
at a $50,000 loss, then the depositors and the bank would share their losses 
in the same amounts. 
While advocates of Islamic finance have heaped no shortage of praise 
upon this method of financing,52 it suffers from one significant drawback. It 
does not work, and for reasons quite apart from regulatory constraints.53 For 
one thing, depositors with demand deposit accounts are not likely to be par-
ticularly patient for very long if they see their deposit amounts reduced be-
cause of bank losses. This leaves the bank quite susceptible to a bank run as 
depositors rush to withdraw their funds before the cash runs out.54 Moreover, 
the bank would need to be much more involved in the monitoring and man-
agement of its portfolio investments if it were to be sharing in their profits, 
rather than just earning a fixed return.55 This would not be cheap, and would 
reduce the returns of the depositors, leading the bank to be uncompetitive.56 
For these and many other reasons, those banks which initially tried profit and 
loss sharing—in jurisdictions where bank regulation presented no obstacle— 
failed rather miserably at it, and alternative models began to develop.57 
These alternative models have traditionally been based on the artifice 
known as the murabaha, which works out to a credit sale with a markup.58 
                                                                                                                         
52 See, e.g., Mirakhor & Zaidi, supra note 39, at 49 (“[P]rofit-sharing contracts have 
superior properties for risk management, because the payment the entrepreneur has to make 
to the creditor is reduced in bad states of nature.”); USMANI, supra note 34, at 27–28; Chapra, 
supra note 34, at 4 (“Instead of making the bankers as well as depositors share in the risks 
of business, the conventional financial system almost relieves them of the risks. The ability 
of the market to impose the required discipline thus gets impaired and leads to an unhealthy 
expansion in the overall volume of credit, to excessive leverage, to even subprime debt, and 
to living beyond means.”). 
53 VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 3, at 135. 
54 Id. at 134. 
55 Hamoudi, supra note 4, at 117. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 117–18. 
58 VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 3, at 135. 
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Essentially, the bank purchases the entire property, and then sells it imme-
diately to the homeowner at a markup, with the homeowner paying $10,000 
immediately, and the balance over the course of thirty years.59 
It should not be difficult to see how this replicates a fixed rate mortgage 
in its economic effects much more closely than it does a profit and loss shar-
ing model. For a fixed rate thirty-year mortgage, at an interest rate of 3.770 
percent, a $90,000 loan for a $100,000 home (with the homeowner paying 
the balance as a $10,000 down payment) would require a total payment of 
$150,417.39, divided into equal monthly installments of $417.83. However, 
if the bank were not to loan the money at all, but purchase the home on the 
market for $100,000, then it could sell it to the homeowner for $160,417.39. 
Of this sum, $10,000 is due immediately and the balance, of $150,417.39, 
would be due to the bank, with the homeowner paying it in monthly in-
stallments of $417.83. This amount would not be subject to change if the 
value of the home increased or decreased, because the bank had already sold 
the home to the homeowner for a price certain. The primary risks to the 
bank—the bankruptcy or delinquency of the homeowner—are those that 
exist as to a conventional lender as well. There is simply not very much profit 
or loss sharing to speak of. Still, the murabaha is one of the two premier 
contracts used in Islamic retail banking.60 
Despite the obvious departure from the profit and loss sharing princi-
ple, industry advocates provide two reasons for the permissibility of the 
murabaha. First, while it is hardly the ideal instrument to be used to bring 
about Islamic banking in its purest form, it is characterized by leading Islamic 
finance expert M. Taqi Usmani as a “transitory step taken in the process of 
the Islamization of the economy,” necessary given the hegemony of conven-
tional banking methods and techniques.61 This notion that Islamic finance is 
neither of a size nor in a setting necessary to enable it to carry through on its 
true principles of profit sharing is a rather popular one.62 It is used to justify 
almost any compromise that the industry makes from the values it articu-
lates respecting profit and loss sharing.63 
                                                                                                                         
59 Id. 
60 Hamoudi, supra note 4, at 119. See also Umar F. Moghul, No Pain, No Gain: The 
State of the Industry in Light of an American Islamic Private Equity Transaction, 7 CHI. 
J. INT’L L. 469, 471 (2007). The other major form of financing is lease financing, through 
the ijara. I have not discussed lease financing here as used in the industry extensively for 
reasons of space, but it suffices to say for these purposes that Islamic financing through 
ijara relies no more on profit and loss sharing than the murabaha does. Id.; see also El-
Gamal, supra note 32, at 129.  
61 USMANI, supra note 34, at 72. 
62 Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Surprising Irrelevance of Islamic Bankruptcy, 19 AM. 
BANK. INST. L. REV. 505, 517 (2011). 
63 See, e.g., Moghul, supra note 60, at 471–73. 
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The second justification for the murabaha, and the more pertinent one 
for our purposes, is that when properly administered, it is different from a 
conventional loan even if it is not very much of a profit and loss sharing 
instrument.64 This is because the bank does own the home for the period of 
time between purchasing it, and eventually transferring it to the homeowner 
via a resale. This element of possession, physical or constructive is described 
by the widely respected M. Taqi Usmani as “the only feature of murabaha 
which can distinguish it from an interest-based transaction[.]” He insists 
that it “must be observed with due diligence at all costs,” emphasizing the 
point by placing this proviso in bold letters.65 
To be clear, this incidence of ownership does not create a risk if adminis-
tered by any reasonably competent bank manager.66 Admittedly, if the period 
of time that the bank happens to own the real estate before it has been trans-
ferred to the homeowner was significant, then a risk might indeed exist. That 
risk would not be that the homeowner would somehow refuse to purchase 
the property because that sale contract would have been concluded before 
the bank initially purchased the property. Rather, it would be that during the 
period that the bank owned the home, the home might be destroyed by fire or 
other natural disaster, that the value of the property would diminish dramat-
ically for any other reason, triggering a buyer default, or that any of the other 
risks incident to the ownership of property might come to pass. 
Yet while he does not say this, surely Usmani realizes as well as anyone 
else how easy it is to reduce that risk to such an extent that it is infinites-
imally small and entirely meaningless by any effective measure.67 If the 
bank’s sole risk lies in holding the property for some period of time, and yet 
no minimum period of time is specified, the obvious solution would be to 
reduce the time period of such ownership. The chance of a zoning change 
taking effect over a particular piece of property on a given day might be 
small, but the chance that it occurs in a five minute period is even smaller, 
and over five seconds smaller yet. Render the period one one-thousandth 
of a second, and only marginal risks remain.  
Thus, even without regulatory constraints, we see that Islamic finance 
exists in a considerably straitjacketed form, one that claims that the basis of 
the industry is profit and loss sharing, but also one that has by its own admis-
sion relied instead heavily on artifice and mimicry to grow into the size that 
it has.68 A primary justification offered in defense of such artifice, at least 
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65 USMANI, supra note 34, at 75. 
66 Id. at 166. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 162. 
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with respect to the murabaha, is that the fact of property ownership involved 
therewith distinguishes it in important ways from a conventional trans-
action, even if the risks associated with that ownership may be quite small.69 
The next section will demonstrate how regulatory constraints require Islamic 
banks to downplay and almost dismiss the latter formal distinction on which 
such emphasis is placed. The section will further show how other, central 
violations of shari’a likewise become necessary in order to comply with 
fundamental U.S. regulatory rules. 
II. ON THE ILLEGALITY OF BANK PROFIT AND LOSS SHARING 
Per U.S. regulation, banks are not supposed to operate under profit and 
loss sharing principles.70 In fact, profit and loss sharing principles are the 
antithesis of how banks are supposed to operate. A number of laws and reg-
ulations make this amply clear.71 This section will describe a series of subject 
areas in the field of financial regulation and further show the extent to which 
the relevant rules in these respective areas make shari’a compliant banking 
absolutely impossible. I begin with the most straightforward of the regula-
tory limitations, which prohibit the ownership of real estate outright. 
A. Regulation and Asset Ownership 
The National Banking Act generally bars a bank from owning real estate.72 
The purpose of the real estate ban seems obvious enough—a bank should not 
be subject to the risks of real estate ownership, from the potential decline in 
housing values to risks associated with rezoning or natural disaster.73 Hence, as 
an exception, a bank may own the real estate on which it places its branch 
offices, and it may hold real estate for up to five years when the real estate 
was secured by a mortgage issued by the bank.74 In the former case, the bank 
would not be at any significant risk given the relatively small amount of 
real property at issue. In the latter case, the circumstances make ownership 
                                                                                                                         
69 Id. at 166. 
70 See infra Part II.A–C. 
71 See infra Part II.A–C. 
72 12 U.S.C.A. § 29 (West 2013). 
73 Obviously, any bank that lends money to future homeowners is secondarily vulner-
able, to some extent, to the same risks as a homeowner because the homeowner who is sub-
jected directly to those risks is more likely to be delinquent in making mortgage payments 
when there is a problem. Still, the risks of real estate ownership are most directly felt by the 
owner rather than the institution that lent the owner the money necessary to make the pur-
chase. Or at least Congress appears to have so concluded by virtue of its enactment of the 
real estate ownership ban for banks contained in 12 U.S.C.A. § 29. 
74 12 U.S.C.A. § 29. 
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unavoidable—the bank must foreclose on the property that secured its initial 
loan if it is to get its money back—but are minimized to the extent realistic by 
requiring a resale within five years of taking possession. 
Highly idealized profit and loss sharing schemes such as those described 
in the previous section are therefore unthinkable because they run directly 
afoul of the letter and the spirit of the real estate ownership prohibition.75 
Interestingly, even the highly formalistic murabaha artifice seems to be en-
compassed within the ban as well, even if it does not involve a noticeable 
risk to the bank by virtue of ownership. This is because the ban itself is not 
conditioned upon any assumption of risk, but instead flatly prevents a bank 
from being able to lawfully “purchase, hold and convey real estate.”76 In a 
murabaha transaction, it would be doing all three prohibited acts, purchasing 
the real estate on behalf of the buyer, holding it for an infinitesimal period of 
time, and then conveying it to the buyer.77 Yet, without being able to engage 
in this practice, one of the premier profit-making instruments of the Islamic 
bank would be taken away, and it could not function. 
The solution was to treat the ownership as fiction, and indeed to condi-
tion permissibility on the maintaining of that fiction.78 The specific context 
of that solution arose in 1999, when the Islamic Bank of Kuwait sought to 
issue murabaha facilities in the United States notwithstanding the real estate 
prohibition.79 In so doing, it made a series of representations respecting the 
nature of the murabaha that ultimately made their way into the OCC’s inter-
pretive letter #867 of 1999 and on the basis of which the interpretive letter 
permitted the practice notwithstanding the statutory prohibition.80 
Hence, for example, the interpretive letter describes the transaction as one 
in which the customer identifies the property, negotiates the price with the 
seller, and applies to the bank for financing.81 If the bank approves, then the 
bank simultaneously enters into a purchase agreement with the seller and a 
murabaha with the buyer. The bank then purchases the property from the 
seller and simultaneously sells it to the buyer at a markup which is ‘typically’ 
                                                                                                                         
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 USMANI, supra note 34, at 166. 
78 Victoria Lynn Zyp, Islamic Finance in The States: Product Development and Regu-
latory Adoption 19-20 (Apr. 21, 2009) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Georgetown University), 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/552821/ZypVictoriaLynn 
.pdf?sequence=1. 
79 Id. at 10–11.  
80 Id. at 15, 20. 
81 Office of the Dist. Counsel, Comptroller of the Currency, Adm’r of Nat’l Banks, 
Interpretive Letter #867, at 2 (Nov. 1999), http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and        
-precedents/nov99/int867.pdf [hereinafter OCC Letter 867]. 
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based on LIBOR, a standard benchmark interest rate.82 The letter requires 
the bank to represent that the transaction is “functionally equivalent” to a se-
cured loan and indeed relies on this representation to permit the practice.83 
Given the simultaneous purchase and resale by the bank, the matter of its 
ownership then becomes almost metaphysical in nature. How does one go 
about “owning” an item for no time at all? If this were not enough, addi-
tional provisions reduce any risks of ownership to the real estate that might 
remain. Specifically, the interpretive letter requires the bank’s representation 
that the risks in the transaction “are identical to the risks in a conventional 
mortgage or loan transaction.”84 Rather incoherently, the customer must also 
have already made its down payment before the first sale to the bank takes 
place, meaning that the purchaser has paid an institution to purchase property 
from it that it does not own. Moreover, no representations or warranties may 
be given by the bank as to the underlying property.85 Finally, the bank agrees 
it “will not operate the property, pay taxes, insurance, or other charges, main-
tain upkeep of the premises, make repairs when necessary, assume liability 
for injuries or other accidents on the property, or otherwise exercise dominion 
or control over the property.”86 In sum, in all legal and economic respects, the 
ownership by the bank—that one facet that Usmani indicates distinguishes 
the murabaha from prohibited interest87—must be legally and economically 
meaningless in its entirety if the transaction is to be legal. The bank must 
disclose this or it may not operate lawfully.88 
Even the definition of title, the single formal indicium of ownership 
left for the bank to cling to, is stripped bare in the context of the interpretive 
letter’s legal discussion. Not only does the legal discussion dismiss the issue 
of bank ownership as being completely irrelevant to the economic substance 
of the transaction, and repeat that at some length, but it also refers to the bank 
holding only “legal” title.89 Lest the reader be confused as to what “legal 
title” constitutes, the letter supplies a definition taken from Black’s Law 
Dictionary, to the effect that legal title creates an “apparent right of ownership 
and possession” but “no beneficial interest therein.”90 The distinction as be-
tween legal title and beneficial interest is a natural and common one in trust 
                                                                                                                         
82 Id. at 2–3. 
83 Id. at 1–2. 
84 Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
85 Id. at 4. 
86 Id. at 5. 
87 USMANI, supra note 34, at 75. 
88 Id. at 75. 
89 OCC Letter 867, supra note 81, at 8. 
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law; where one person may own the assets, but may not be permitted to bene-
fit from them or their usufruct, even as another has a beneficiary interest, but 
no legal title.91 In the context of a credit sale such as the murabaha, however, 
its use is rather bizarre. It suggests that the bank never has an equitable right 
in the property.92 As a legal matter, it cannot do anything with the property; 
the bank is merely the “apparent owner” with someone else (at first the orig-
inal seller and then the final purchaser), at all times holding all beneficial in-
terests in the property. Thus, the bank’s ownership is entirely meaningless.93 
So as to underscore the matter, the letter concludes its legal section by indi-
cating that “despite the appearance of the Branch briefly holding real estate,” 
the transaction is in substance that of mortgagor and mortgagee.94 
This letter, it must be emphasized, establishes the legal basis of all mura-
baha transactions undertaken by Islamic banks in the United States involv-
ing real property.95 The compromise made by the banks to comply with 
applicable laws and regulations could not be starker. Not only must they 
abandon every pretense at profit and loss sharing, they must also explicitly 
disclaim the sole distinction that exists between the murabaha and the con-
ventional loan, the fact of bank ownership. They cannot even credibly claim 
very much in the way of formal ownership.96 To paraphrase from the inter-
pretive letter, all that is left for them is the appearance of the bank holding 
real estate.97 Usmani’s distinction between the murabaha and the fixed in-
terest loan has thus collapsed into semantics: the bank is the owner only in 
the sense that it claims ownership at the same moment it is transferring the 
property.98 But for this entirely semantic claim, which the OCC is willing 
to humor, the transaction is interest based.99 
Though this Article focuses primarily on use of the murabaha under 
U.S. law, it is worth noting that a second interpretive letter, one dealing with 
lease financing, was issued two years earlier in 1997, which also relied rather 
heavily on the “largely cosmetic” nature of legal title and the fact that it does 
not relate to the “indicia of ownership.”100 That case largely involved per-
mission for a rent to own arrangement similar to the one discussed in the 
                                                                                                                         
91 See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 828 (8th ed. 2004) (defining beneficial interest 
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previous Part except that in economic substance, the bank does not “actually 
own real estate.”101 The bank does not even own the property in any recogniz-
able legal sense. Nor does it maintain the property or pay property taxes.102 
Instead, it records its interest in the property as if it were an ordinary mort-
gage, and its rights upon the owner’s default are not those of a co-owner, 
but of a secured lender.103 It is hard to even know what legal title consti-
tutes under such an arrangement, where the title documents themselves do 
not suggest the bank is the legal owner, and where all of the bank’s legal and 
economic rights are identical to those of a secured lender, not a mortgagor. 
B. Problems of Prepayment 
While the real estate ownership ban renders the practice of Islamic bank-
ing rather problematic, an Islamic bank might nonetheless insist that there is 
some (bare) form of shari’a compliance at work given the OCC accom-
modations. The argument is a difficult one given the rather strained defini-
tion of title and the OCC demand that risks be identical to a conventional 
loan. This is particularly important in light of Usmani’s insistence that the 
incidence of ownership supplies the basis of the distinction as between a 
murabaha and a loan.104 However, it is sustainable, in the highly abstract 
sense that the bank “owned” the asset (albeit for no time at all given the 
simultaneous transfer), and the OCC acknowledged that some type of legal 
title transfer took place.105 The same is not true for several other regulatory 
hurdles that make Islamic banking impossible. The most obvious of these 
hurdles relates to prepayment. 
When a borrower prepays under a conventional loan, the amount of in-
terest due on the loan is correspondingly reduced. That is, the borrower in 
our previous section, who took out a thirty year $90,000 fixed interest mort-
gage at 3.770 percent, owes a net amount of $150,417.39 if each payment 
is made on time. If the borrower manages to make a first monthly payment 
of $30,000, effectively prepaying part of the principal of the loan, the total 
amount due will be reduced. This is because interest will not be collecting on 
the principal that the owner has already paid. While banks can offer mort-
gages with “prepayment penalties” that impose fees on borrowers who wish 
to pay their mortgage in advance of its due date, the bank must disclose such 
fees to the prospective homeowner.106 
                                                                                                                         
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 2. 
104 USMANI, supra note 34, at 73. 
105 OCC Letter 867, supra note 81, at 6. 
106 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(k) (2012). See also Ornstein et al., Prepayment Penalty Disclosure 
Under the Truth in Lending Act, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 278 (2007) (“Regulation Z 
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However, under a murabaha, a prepayment should have no effect at all 
on the total sum due. The homeowner in the case of the murabaha has al-
ready committed to pay a purchase price. In our example above, that purchase 
price, not counting the down payment, is $150,417.39. While the buyer is not 
obligated to pay this sum in advance of the due date of the installments, the 
buyer is also not relieved of its obligation to pay the total sum by virtue of 
prepaying.107 In fact, classical jurists generally, and the contemporary Islamic 
Fiqh Academy specifically, forbid the conditioning of any prepayment of a 
murabaha on the receipt of a discount for that prepayment.108 To quote al-
Zuhayli, one of the most prominent and well-known scholars of the modern 
era: “a reduction of liability based on prepayment is very similar to increas-
ing it based on deferment.”109 The latter is almost the very definition of pro-
hibited money interest, meaning that to reduce a sum due and owing because 
of a prepayment is to stand in opposition to shari’a, at least as it is understood 
among the jurists and clerics who define the practice of Islamic finance. 
There is, however, an exception that Islamic banks could claim to be ex-
ploiting, though it is not a particularly plausible one. Usmani indicates that 
a voluntary rebate by a seller, one that was not conditioned by the buyer’s 
prepayment, is acceptable upon a buyer’s prepayment so long as the buyer can-
not claim it by right and it is not a condition of the prepayment by contract.110  
This exception appears quite far from the practice of one of the largest 
Islamic banks operating in the United States, University Bank. It does not 
even attempt to justify its commitment to forgive part of the buyer’s pur-
chase price if it is prepaid. On its own website, in the “Frequently Asked 
Questions” section, the following question and answer appear: 
7.  Can I pay off my contract early? Is there a penalty for doing this? 
 
Our Murabaha contract does not have any pre-payment penalties. You 
can pay off the remaining acquisition balance at any time you wish. 
                                                                                                                         
requires that in interest-bearing consumer credit transactions, such as most residential mort-
gage loans, creditors must disclose in the final TIL disclosure whether there may be a pen-
alty for prepayment of the loan. Model Form H-2 suggests that the following statement be 
included in the final TIL disclosure: ‘If you pay off early, you [may] [will not] be required 
to pay a prepayment penalty.’ A TILA violation will occur if the creditor checks the wrong 
box or fails to check a box altogether.”).  
107 USMANI, supra note 34, at 99–100. 
108 Id. at 99–100; Mohammad H. Fadel, Riba, Efficiency, and Prudential Regulation: 
Preliminary Thoughts, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 655, 659–60 (2008) (citing Averroes for the 
principle of forbidding the prepayment of a murabaha). 
109 Fadel, supra note 108, at 660 n.21 (quoting WAHBAH AL-ZUHAYLI, FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 311 (Mahmoud A. El-Gamal trans., Dar al-
fikr, 2003)). 
110 USMANI, supra note 34, at 143. 
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Profit portion is prorated, and UIF agrees to accept lesser profit should 
you choose to pay off the contract early.111 
This is to some extent obfuscating, as in fact the issue with a murabaha 
is not that there is a “penalty” for prepaying. Rather, what the bank de-
scribes as an “acquisition price”—the purchase price paid by the home-
owner—is being reduced by the bank virtue of the homeowner’s early 
payment.  Moreover, this reduction is hardly “voluntary” and noncontractual, 
as demanded by Usmani.  The bank has committed to this on this website and 
in its promotional material.  It would be patent fraud not to forgive part of the 
“acquisition price” on this basis of this whenever a prepayment occurred.  In 
other words, a prepayment of a murabaha to the University Bank will oper-
ate precisely as a prepayment of a loan would as a matter of contract and in 
plain violation of the shari’a as enunciated by such luminaries as Averroes, 
Zuhayli, Usmani and the Islamic Fiqh Academy.   
If the bank truly wanted to reflect a voluntary undertaking of the sort 
that Usmani described as narrowly permissible, it would have to phrase the 
paragraph quoted above in the following manner: 
7.  Can I pay off my contract early? Is there a penalty for doing this? 
 
We are not obligated under Shariah guidelines to collect less than the full 
acquisition price and indeed we are prevented under Shariah guidelines 
from guaranteeing or otherwise promising in any fashion that an early 
payoff amount will reduce the full acquisition price. However, consistent 
with Quranic encouragement to be kind to debtors, we may voluntarily 
accept an early payment and forgive the portion of the acquisition price that 
would correspond to a prepayment penalty in a conventional loan. We may 
also forgive less than this, or more, or forgive none of the acquisition price 
at all, as the decision to forgive any amounts, while recommended by the 
Qur’an, must be entirely voluntary on our part or it is Islamically invalid. 
This would certainly be the type of rebate that was voluntary, though it is 
also one that is contrary to applicable law unless the prepayment penalty rate 
is disclosed. And if it is disclosed, it is hard to imagine many Muslim home-
owners wanting to own a home on such unfavorable market terms. Shari’a 
compliance is, as the University Bank’s own documents inescapably prove, 
impossible if compliance with applicable U.S. law is to be achieved. 
C. On the Acceptance of “Interest” as Profit 
Prepayment is not the only obstacle that renders Islamic banking impos-
sible in the United States. More problems arise in the interest deduction for 
                                                                                                                         
111 Home Financing—Murabaha—Frequently Asked Questions, UNIVERSITY ISLAMIC 
FINANCIAL, http://www.myuif.com/faq-forms/home-financing-faq/murabaha-faq/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 12, 2014). 
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mortgages. Under U.S. law, a homeowner may deduct any interest paid on a 
mortgage from their income on their annual tax returns.112 While a home-
owner could legally forgo this quite valuable home interest deduction, it 
would render the Islamic home financing market dramatically uncompeti-
tive relative to its conventional counterpart. The market would not be sus-
tainable under those conditions. 
In order for the homeowner to take advantage of the deduction, however, 
the homeowner must be paying interest. In fact, the amount that the home-
owner deducts is precisely the amount that appears in Box 1 on Form 1098 
issued by the Internal Revenue Service, which corresponds to “[m]ortgage 
interest received by a payer(s)/borrower(s).”113 
The University Bank is aware of this, as is apparent from the following 
excerpt from its “Frequently Asked Questions” section: 
If there is no interest on the Murabaha transaction, will I still get a 
1098-INT statement for income tax purposes? 
 
As a financial institution, we are only able to show profit on the financing 
of a home in one fashion. Thus we will issue a 1098-INT which you may 
choose to use to deduct from your taxes.114 
Though the bank is careful not to describe explicitly any payments made 
by a homeowner as “interest,” this deliberately elliptical answer necessitates 
that conclusion, given that the Form 1098 makes absolutely clear that it is 
calculating mortgage interest, not any other form of profit. Any given indi-
vidual buyer, of course, is free to take the deduction, or not, though this in 
the end matters little.115 The bank’s return is “interest” and is characterized 
under United States law as “interest,” whether or not a buyer wishes to de-
scribe it as such on the buyer’s own tax return.116 
This further adds to the woes of the Islamic bank that is seeking to oper-
ate on a shari’a compliant basis. The point of Islamic banking was to act as 
an alternative to interest based finance based on profit and loss sharing.117 
                                                                                                                         
112 26 U.S.C.A. § 163(h)(3) (West 2013). 
113 See IRS, FORM 1098 (2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1098.pdf 
(emphasis added).  
114 Home Financing—Murabaha—Frequently Asked Questions, UNIVERSITY ISLAMIC 
FINANCIAL, supra note 111. 
115 It is hard to see why a buyer would not do so. Surely if a pious Muslim buyer finds a 
tax form in her mail indicating she has paid interest over the course of the year and finds that 
unobjectionable, she will likewise find a claiming of the deduction to be unobjectionable. 
116 26 U.S.C.A. § 163(a) (stating a deduction shall “be allowed,” but not mandating one 
be taken); see also infra note 120 and accompanying text.  
117 USMANI, supra note 34, at 162. 
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When this proved to be difficult, the practice then at least claimed to be in-
volved in the buying and selling of assets. Rules on real estate ownership 
largely stripped this possibility away, except for semantic niceties permitted 
by the OCC respecting “apparent” ownership by virtue of “legal” title.118 
In the context of the mortgage deduction, the Islamic bank does not even 
have the comfort of semantics—it is forced to describe its profits as interest 
to have any hope of remaining economically viable in the United States.119 
Finally, the requirement that Islamic banks abandon any semantic pre-
tense that they are involved in anything other than the issuance of commer-
cial loans at interest extends far beyond the mortgage interest deduction. The 
Federal Reserve has issued a series of stringent disclosure rules—set forth 
in Regulation Z and issued in furtherance of the Truth in Lending Act—to 
which every lender must adhere when offering loans to consumers, includ-
ing home mortgages.120 The core of these regulations require disclosure to the 
homeowner of the cost of credit—namely, the annual percentage rate and 
the finance charge.121 That is, the bank cannot engage in its core business 
without describing to its constituency that it is not shari’a compliant. 
D. Profit and Loss Sharing Between Bank and Depositor 
We have seen that when making the bulk of their portfolio investments, 
Islamic banks must disclaim any significance to the one element that distin-
guishes their credit mechanism from that of a conventional loan, namely their 
purchase and sale of the underlying asset for which they are extending 
credit.122 We have also seen that the banks must describe their profit as in-
terest, and that they must effectively treat it as interest for purposes of prepay-
ment, rather than as a purchase and sale.123 This Article, however, has not 
yet touched upon the greatest violation of the shari’a to which an Islamic 
bank is subject under relevant financial regulation. This is the fact that, far 
                                                                                                                         
118 OCC Letter 867, supra note 81, at 8. 
119 Unfortunately for buyer and bank alike, as Mann demonstrates in a thorough analysis 
of the matter, it is far from clear that the IRS accepts the characterization of the bank’s profit 
amounts as deductible interest. Mann, supra note 6, at 1152–57. This creates a rather deli-
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120 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1–.4 (2011). 
121 Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Techniques of Mandatory Disclosure: 
Socioeconomics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 
213 (2005). 
122 See supra Part II.A. 
123 See supra Part II.C. 
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from sharing profits and losses, federal law and regulation, as set forth below, 
effectively require Islamic banks to insure that bank depositors suffer no 
losses at all under any circumstances.124 This, of course, is precisely what 
occurs with an interest bearing account. 
To be defined as a bank under the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA), 
an institution must meet one of the two criteria: either (1) the bank must be 
federally insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), or 
(2) it must both be in the business of offering commercial loans and it must 
offer demand deposits, thereby enabling the depositor to withdraw the money 
in the account at any time without prior notice.125 
 The second of these criteria is not possible for an Islamic bank if it 
wishes to be shari’a compliant because the bank is not engaging in the busi-
ness of making commercial loans. Indeed, the whole point of its existence is 
to avoid the taking of interest, which is an inherent feature of commercial 
loans.126 Moreover, because of the fear of a bank run each time that property 
values drop, it is unclear whether a bank could tie up substantial amounts 
of its funds in assets as illiquid and uncertain as ownership in real property 
and still offer demand deposits.127 
In any event, the matter of compliance with the second criteria is largely 
academic because the practice of offering FDIC insurance is so widespread 
that, as a practical matter, it is hard to imagine a banking institution of any 
significant size being able to operate without it.128 To the extent that those 
seeking to expand Islamic finance in the United States are imagining Islamic 
retail banks of significant size, they surely must be contemplating those with 
national charters that are members of the Federal Reserve and thus have 
FDIC insurance.129 Hence, University Bank, the only Islamic bank with de-
mand deposit services in the United States, is federally insured.130 
Moreover, government insured deposits are a cornerstone of financial reg-
ulation in the United States, and, indeed, in any jurisdiction with a mature 
                                                                                                                         
124 See infra Part II.E. 
125 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(c)(1) (West 2013). Certain exceptions are offered under § 1841 
(c)(2). 
126 See USMANI, supra note 34, at 6. 
127 See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 3, at 134.  
128 See generally RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. 
MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 73–76 (4th ed. 2009) (de-
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129 A bank with a national charter by definition is a member of the Federal Reserve and 
therefore has insurance from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Id. at 76. 
130 Business Shariah-Compliant Profit-Sharing Savings Accounts, UNIVERSITY ISLAMIC 
FINANCIAL, http://www.myuif.com/banking/business-shariah-compliant-profit-sharing-sav 
ings-accounts/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
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financial system.131 A bank regulator’s primary concern is a bank panic 
caused by nervous depositors who are aware that most of the funds of the 
bank are engaged in assets, and who might therefore withdraw their funds 
from a healthy bank while the bank still has liquid assets available for distri-
bution if others are doing the same.132 The decision of one group of depos-
itors to do this would lead other rational depositors to do the same until the 
bank would have no liquid assets.133 This would result in a liquidity crunch 
for the bank because it is unable to satisfy remaining demands despite having 
substantial non-liquid assets (such as bank mortgages).134 Bank default would 
follow. The default of one bank might lead to panic among depositors in other 
banks, resulting ultimately in a financial collapse.135 There is, in this sense, 
a certain instability in the financial system that requires attention. 
Federal deposit insurance avoids this problem because it obligates the 
government to pay the depositor back if the bank cannot somehow supply 
the funds.136 Thus, there is no reason for any rational depositor to “panic” 
and withdraw its funds even if the bank finds itself in a difficult economic 
situation. Government insurance, in other words, is the premier means used 
by mature financial regulators to prevent a bank panic.137 
The stark variance with the shari’a thus becomes unmistakably clear. It 
is true that an Islamic bank’s portfolio investments have shifted from silent 
partnership arrangements to credit sales and lease finances, as we have 
seen.138 However, the bank deposits have remained structured in the form of 
the silent partnership.139 Few things are clearer in Islamic finance than that 
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the rules of the silent partnership, consistent with the principles underlying 
Islamic finance, require profits and losses be shared between the parties 
thereto.140 Indeed, the central objection that Islamic finance proponents have 
been making for decades against the taking of conventional interest is specif-
ically that it does not permit sharing as between profits and losses as a proper 
Islamic system would through mechanisms such as the silent partnership.141 
It is thus hard to imagine a more central violation of the rules of the silent 
partnership than one that permits a depositor to have back the full amount of 
the deposit, even as the depositor’s silent partner, the bank, with whom the 
depositor was supposed to share all profits and losses, descends into bank-
ruptcy. It simply defies logic for an institution to provide for this, and for a 
depositor to accept it, while still claiming to be adhering to the shari’a as 
it has been understood in Islamic finance over the past half century. 
E. Regulatory Accommodation? 
Of course, the mere fact that there are obstacles to the creation of a truly 
shari’a compliant Islamic bank does not mean on its own that such a bank 
is necessarily impossible. After all, as the Introduction demonstrated, the fed-
eral government has undertaken extensive efforts at dialogue and engage-
ment with proponents and practitioners of, and experts in, Islamic finance.142 
Therefore, it is worth asking whether, by working together, Islamic finance 
and U.S. banking regulators might find a way to a mutually satisfactory 
accommodation. The answer, it seems rather plain, is no. 
As an initial matter, there is the fact that despite all the dialogue and en-
gagement, there have been no significant accommodations made as to Islamic 
                                                                                                                         
accounts’ earn a share of the profits and are exposed to potential losses.... On the assets side, 
Islamic banks avoid the risks of profit and loss-sharing investment arrangements by engag-
ing mostly in cost-plus trading and lease financing.”). 
140 USMANI, supra note 34, at 38 (indicating that in a silent partnership, or even an ordi-
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extent of his financing.”). See also M. UMER CHAPRA, TOWARDS A JUST MONETARY SYSTEM 
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have a share in the profit.”); SIDDIQI, supra note 44, at 11; Seif I. Tag El-Din, Towards 
Optimal Risk Management for Profit-Sharing Finance, ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON WEALTH 
CREATION 188, 189 (Munawar Iqbal & Rodney Wilson eds., 2005). 
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profit and loss sharing. See also Mirakhor & Zaidi, supra note 39, at 49; Tag El-Din, supra 
note 140, at 189 (citing references offering supposed economic benefits of profit and loss 
sharing mechanisms such as the silent partnership). 
142 See supra Introduction.  
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finance since 1999.143 Surely, if mutually acceptable solutions could be 
found, the players would have at least found some of them by now. 
That said, some of the simpler and more straightforward problems might 
be addressed. It is not impossible to envisage a revised Regulation Z, for 
example, that does not require an Islamic bank to disclose to a potential 
borrower an effective “interest” rate, but perhaps instead an “Islamic bank 
profit rate.” As with the 1999 OCC interpretive letter, which describes the 
asset purchases that are part of a murabaha as nominal and the risk profile 
as being functionally equivalent to a commercial loan,144 the relevant dis-
closure would have to indicate something similar. It could state, for example, 
that the Islamic rate of return in the agreement is a guaranteed rate, that the 
consumer will be forced to pay it, and that the consumer undertakes the same 
risks, rights, and obligations with respect to this transaction as any borrower 
would on any interest-bearing loan. The accommodation, in other words, 
would be semantic, but would at least avoid the problem Islamic banks and 
borrowers face when being required to describe their returns as “interest.” 
Whether federal regulators would want to go through the necessary time and 
expense of amending relevant regulatory rules to accommodate a practice 
of relatively limited size is a separate matter, but at least from a theoretical 
perspective, a solution is not difficult to contemplate.145 
The matter of the interest deduction presents greater difficulties if we 
assume, as seems reasonable, that Congress will not repeal the home mort-
gage interest deduction at any point in the near future.146 Islamic banks will 
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have to jettison the shari’a and describe their profits as interest to enable 
homeowners to take advantage of it, as the University Bank currently does.147 
It may seem at first glance that the IRS could issue a private letter or reve-
nue ruling that resembled the OCC letters of 1997 and 1999 by indicating 
that some of the more common instruments deployed in Islamic finance re-
semble interest in economic substance, and that the IRS will treat them as 
such. However, this is not so simple.148 Specifically, it will be difficult to 
issue a ruling that is of sufficient generality to be of use to Islamic banks, 
while not creating a series of additional problems relating to what consti-
tutes debt for tax purposes in broader settings.149 This is to say nothing of 
even knottier problems relating to even more complex tax issues ranging 
from depreciation to passive activity loss rules.150 Hence, one prominent 
commentator stated that were he the IRS, he would seek to know as little as 
possible about these religious-based transactions.151 The IRS appears to 
have heeded the advice. 
No obvious solution arises as to prepayment either, where the shari’a 
violation requiring a corresponding reduction in principal seems unavoid-
able and quite serious. However, it is in the area of deposit guarantees where 
the impossibility of Islamic banking is by far the most apparent. For it is as 
anathema to shari’a to guarantee a silent partnership against loss, as it is im-
portant to federal regulators that such insurance be firmly in place. On this 
matter, the United States is moving in the opposite direction from Islamic 
finance, particularly after the financial crisis of 2008, as demonstrated by the 
                                                                                                                         
“political suicide” akin to eliminating benefits such as Social Security and Medicare). To 
be clear, many have articulated sound reasons that Congress should eliminate the home 
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2014] THE IMPOSSIBLE, HIGHLY DESIRED ISLAMIC BANK 135 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act.152 Among the many things the Act does is increase the deposit insur-
ance available per bank account to $250,000, from $100,000.153 During the 
height of the crisis and through 2012, the FDIC-insured qualifying bank 
deposit accounts were without limit.154 
Of course, the financial sector’s troubles in the recent financial crisis 
related much more to troubles at investment banking outfits undertaking ex-
cessive risk than to depositor panic at traditional banks.155 However, since 
the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, investment banking and commercial 
banking have often operated within different divisions of the same conglom-
erate bank holding company.156 In light of this, federal regulators and Congress 
seem to have found it necessary to increase limitations on deposits, without 
limit when the crisis was particularly acute. This was precisely to avoid the 
problem becoming worse through depositor panic as investment banking di-
visions in bank holding companies found themselves in increasingly difficult 
circumstances.157 It is unimaginable that these same regulatory bodies and 
Congress will not only reverse themselves, but also provide exceptions to 
the very principle of insurance merely to accommodate Islamic banking. 
Even the United Kingdom, a veritable hub of Islamic finance,158 is not 
willing to offer much accommodation. The United Kingdom’s premier finan-
cial regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), will not countenance 
a deposit account subject to loss.159 Instead, with respect to only one Islamic 
bank, the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB), the FSA will merely permit the 
depositor to absorb a guaranteed loss if it chooses to do so at the time of the 
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loss and not earlier.160 In other words, the IBB must insure against losses and 
must offer the depositor the return of the deposit in the event of losses.161  
The legal requirements are precisely what they would be as to a conven-
tional bank and an unambiguous repudiation of shari’a as articulated by 
Islamic finance. However, the FSA has indicated that “after the event”—
meaning after it becomes necessary to pay the depositor back his full deposit, 
notwithstanding the bank’s loss—the depositor has the right to decline the 
repayment and accept the loss for its own account.162 
Despite the broad praise given to the FSA accommodation among student 
commentators,163 its rather limited scope should be apparent. The approach 
seems to permit the depositor to comply with shari’a vis-a-vis the deposit, 
though it is hard to see how the deposit could be said to lie in an Islamic bank. 
Plainly, as an institution, the IBB is consciously and overtly violating shari’a 
on its own terms by offering insured deposits in the first place, and, one must 
presume, honoring their terms when depositors demand it. 
Moreover, it is hard to understand precisely what kind of accommodation 
it is to permit someone not to accept money being offered to them. Presum-
ably, the depositor would have the “right” to decline compensation for its 
deposit loss any time it pleased, simply by not cashing the FSA check is-
sued to it, or rewiring the money to whatever account it came from. Finally, 
it should be noted that the FSA took pains to emphasize that it was not in-
tending to establish a general precedent for Islamic banks, that others might 
not be given the same dispensation, and that each case would be evaluated on 
its own merits.164 It is hard to describe the accommodation as anything more 
than a gesture, of little real importance. That it has proven successful, not-
withstanding its legal meaninglessness, helps to explain why it is that Islamic 
banking has proven so appealing to Muslim consumers and depositors, not-
withstanding its patent impossibility. The next section addresses this matter 
in much greater detail. 
III. AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION 
A. Islamic Banks and Muslim Belonging 
Based on the foregoing, a devout Muslim in the United States has very 
little reason to consider engaging in retail Islamic banking if the motivations 
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for doing so are viewed only through the narrow prism of obedience to reli-
gious doctrine. This is not only because the Islamic bank does not engage in 
very much profit and loss sharing, but also because the risk profile of the in-
struments it uses in order to engage in Islamic finance must be “identical” 
to those offered by a conventional mortgage in order to be legal.165 And it is 
not only the fact the bank’s ownership of the asset, in which it claims to be 
trading, is transitory at best, but also the fact that even transitory ownership 
carries no beneficial interest and merely creates the “appearance” of owner-
ship, with recordings on deeds resembling those of a conventional mortgage 
entirely.166 Third, it is not only that the bank routinely treats its resale price 
as including accruing interest, forgiven when principal is repaid, but also 
because it legally obligates itself to do so.167 
These are only the beginning of the doctrinal problems, as we have seen. 
The homeowner also ends up taking an interest deduction on something the 
industry has gone to great lengths to claim is not interest,168 and the bank 
discloses on a government required form that it is interest and what the rate 
of interest is.169 Finally, and perhaps worst of all, depositors are protected 
against loss, obliterating any notion of a profit and loss sharing partnership 
as between them and the Islamic bank and plainly violating the most basic 
rules of such partnerships as set forth in the manuals of Islamic finance.170 
In light of this, it might be fair to ask precisely why there is so much 
comparative interest in expanding the scope and size of such highly compro-
mised institutions. A Muslim who truly found the taking of interest to be the 
prohibited riba of the Qur’an—deeply abhorrent, akin to theft, and a cause 
for divine punishment in the manner described in the Qur’an171—would 
probably be better counseled to avoid banks altogether than to do business 
with Islamic banks of this sort. Options do exist for such a person. At one end 
of the spectrum, the rules of the National Banking Act concerning real estate 
ownership do not apply to savings and loan institutions or credit unions, for 
example.172 Credit unions are also exempt from the definition of “bank” 
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under the National Bank Holding Company Act.173 If the (still substantial) 
regulations corresponding to these institutions nevertheless prove burden-
some, some more committed members of the community might leave the fi-
nancial system entirely and rely on informal networks to finance their homes. 
They might choose to invest their money in the equity markets, where profit 
and loss sharing is generally the norm, and where regulation hence presents 
less of an obstacle.174 Yet none of these alternatives—seemingly doctrinally 
more attractive—has appeared to dampen the enthusiasm for a more prom-
inent Islamic banking presence in the United States. 
To understand this demand better, we must look beyond doctrine and 
consider broader explanations. Specifically, we must consider whether the 
Islamic bank is offering something else of value to the American Muslim, 
even if it is plainly not offering compliance with the shari’a under the stan-
dards set forth by the industry. In fact, it is doing that. The Islamic bank gives 
the Muslim believer an institution of her own, as a mosque permits her a 
place of her own within a broader American fabric. That there will be a se-
vere doctrinal compromise is, in this context, beside the point. What is im-
portant is the institution is Islamic “enough,” bears sufficient features to be 
identifiable as driven by shari’a, even if not, strictly speaking, shari’a com-
pliant, and that it is legal, meaning the U.S. legal regime confers some legit-
imacy on it and, a fortiori, on those Muslims engaged in business with it. 
Much of the material extolling the benefits of Islamic banks seems to be-
tray the salience of this underlying desire. Typical are remarks made in 2005 
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by Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., then the Executive Vice President and General 
Counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.175 While describing in 
some detail the efforts made by United States regulatory authorities to ad-
dress the challenges presented by Islamic banks, Baxter made reference on 
two separate occasions to the “long and cherished history of religious free-
dom in the United States.”176 He further indicated this freedom included a 
state obligation to ensure enforcement of the laws “does not interfere un-
duly with the religious practices of members of our body politic, including 
Muslims.”177 To be blind to Muslim needs in the area of Islamic banking 
would be to act as “enemy” to the United States Constitution, which, Baxter 
indicates, quoting Chief Justice Burger, “affirmatively mandates accommo-
dation, not just tolerance of all religions, and forbids hostility towards any.”178 
To fulfill such accommodation, Baxter concludes, “we will need to continue 
to exhibit the creativity and flexibility that the OCC showed in approving 
the ijara and murabaha financing products.”179 
Yet, as discussed in the Introduction and Part II, federal regulators have 
done virtually nothing to accommodate Islamic finance since 1999, nor is it 
clear they could do very much substantively even if they wanted to. Surely, 
by 2005 the General Counsel to the New York Federal Reserve knew this 
and yet still found it important to extol not only the virtues, but indeed the 
obligation of the United States’ accommodation of the Muslim population 
through facilitation of Islamic finance.180 
This leads to the second, even more telling, problem that lies in Baxter’s 
remarks. In his laudable eagerness to demonstrate Muslims had a place in 
the American fabric, and the Constitution required that legislators and regu-
lators accommodate Muslim interests and practices, the General Counsel to 
the New York Federal Reserve misstated the law. 
First, there is the fact that the Burger quote to which Baxter makes refer-
ence is inapposite. Burger’s insistence on “affirmatively mandated accom-
modation” was in the context of a decision concerning the Establishment 
Clause and, specifically, over the constitutionality of a nativity scene, which 
a municipality wanted to place on public grounds.181 The question Baxter 
poses, however, is not whether regulators are permitted to accommodate 
Islamic finance if they choose under the Establishment Clause, as was the 
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case with respect to the nativity scene, but whether they must under the Free 
Exercise Clause. Is it an obligation of the nation’s institutions to find a way 
to make room for Muslims (as well as adherents of other religions, of course) 
through accommodating them in the general legal and regulatory framework? 
Burger’s dicta may suggest this is so, but since that decision was issued, and 
long before Baxter made his comments, the Supreme Court ruled directly 
otherwise.182 In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court held the 
state does not have the “affirmative[]” constitutional obligation to accom-
modate religious practice under the Free Exercise Clause when it makes law 
(or regulation).183 A neutral, generally applicable law is per se immune from 
constitutional challenge on Free Exercise grounds.184 It is only when the law 
is made with the intention of discriminating against religious practice that it 
is unconstitutional.185 
In other words, the United States Constitution does not mandate that 
banking regulatory authorities do a single thing to accommodate Islamic 
banking within the regulatory scheme so long as the regulations were not 
themselves issued with the purpose of discriminating against Islamic bank-
ing. Religious animus is not a reasonable or fair description of the reasons 
for the regulations described in this Article. The requirement that interest 
rates be disclosed in home financings, for example, is undertaken to permit 
consumers to make informed decisions when taking on debt.186 The reason 
that bank accounts must be insured against loss is to prevent bank runs.187 
Home interest deductions are permitted so as to encourage home owner-
ship.188 The burden on Islamic finance in each case is incidental. Baxter’s 
comments are entirely wrong as a legal matter: regulatory authorities may 
be as “willfully blind” as they wish to the religious implications of their 
rulings in these contexts and not run afoul of the U.S. Constitution. 
The better legal claim is a statutory one—namely, that the Congress en-
acted a law known as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which 
does prevent federal government agencies from imposing a substantial bur-
den on religious exercise unless there is a compelling state interest to do 
so.189 Baxter chose not to indicate that a failure to accommodate was illegal, 
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but rather, that it ran contrary to the Constitution. Based on the Court’s 
rulings, Baxter’s statement simply is not true. 
But to say as much is to miss the point. General Counsel Baxter’s speech 
was not about legal niceties or the interpretation of Supreme Court precedent. 
It was about the place of Muslims in American society, made at a time when 
the United States was deeply involved in two wars in Muslim countries,190 
the standing of the United States in the Muslim world was extremely low,191 
and a culture war regarding the place of Muslims in American society had 
just begun to brew.192 And how much more compelling, how much more 
authoritative, how much more powerful a demonstration of compatibility be-
tween Islam and America could exist than for a leading lawyer to call the 
Constitution to one side to support the Qur’an on the other? How better to 
locate a Muslim in America than to tell that Muslim not only is Islamic bank-
ing accommodated, but also it must be; not because of a law passed by the 
Congress in 1993 which was mostly invalidated,193 but because the nation’s 
founding document, in which its highest ideals are articulated demands it? 
Having established this ground, how much more important than to carry 
through, how understandable the insistence that more be done to actually 
expand Islamic banking in the United States, because this is what Constitu-
tion and Qur’an demand? The inconvenient facts respecting the impossibility 
of Islamic banking are shunted aside in deference to these powerful social 
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and cultural forces, in favor of religious freedom and cultural accommodation 
on the side of the regulators, and from a desire for belonging on the side of 
American Muslim adherents. To do otherwise—to suggest that federal law 
and applicable regulation will not and cannot tolerate Islamic banking—
sounds positively intolerant in such a milieu. And few in the United States 
wish to find themselves portrayed as such. 
B. Islamophobia and Islamic Finance 
As the previous section indicates, it is plainly true that few within the 
United States would seek to describe themselves as intolerant. Yet it is 
equally clear there are significant forces that view Muslims and Islamic 
practices as a threat to the core fabric of the United States and very much 
include, and indeed target, Islamic finance as part of this effort.194 This sec-
tion demonstrates that the core objections of this movement against Islamic 
finance relate far more closely to Muslim presence in the United States than 
anything having to do with Islamic finance on its own terms. 
But in the process of demonstrating this, it is important to point out the 
fundamental quandary that an adherent to a view of Islam as an existential 
threat to the United States faces. In most cases, such an adherent will almost 
surely resist the description of intolerance as much as anyone else. Still it is 
hard to avoid the charge while appearing to engage in an effort to denigrate 
the world’s second largest religion and its 1.6 billion followers.195 
Therefore, it is somewhat important to such adherents to be understood to 
be attacking some sort of totalitarian political movement rather than a reli-
gion. This was the premise of the opposition to the building of a mosque in 
Murfreesboro, Tennessee.196 The appeal of this premise is perfectly obvious. 
If Islam is a religion, then to oppose the building of a mosque in Tennessee 
is to engage in religious bigotry, but if Islam is a totalitarian ideology, then 
the opposition to an Islamic center seems far more principled. The effort in 
Tennessee ultimately failed, and the mosque did open.197 However, the mat-
ter received enough attention and consideration to lead to the extraordinary 
decision of the United States Department of Justice to file an amicus brief 
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in what should have been nothing more than a zoning dispute.198 The pur-
pose of the brief was to clarify to the Tennessee Chancery Court that the 
position of the United States is “uncontroverted” and broadly held across 
all levels of the government—Islam is a religion and thereby entitled to be 
treated as such.199 
In any event, even without the Department of Justice intervention, this 
sort of attack has its limitations. It is difficult to describe Christianity and 
Judaism as religions and then deny the same status to a creed whose central 
belief is that God spoke through the Angel Gabriel to Muhammad, who had 
been chosen by God as Prophet as the Prophets of Israel before him.200 It 
is more common to move the discourse away from Islam and Muslims and 
onto shari’a. At one level, the description of shari’a as a totalitarian ideology 
is equally inane: the problem with rendering shari’a into legal code is not that 
it is excessively rigid, but rather it is too pluralistic, encompassing jurists from 
different schools of thought who come to quite different conclusions on par-
ticular matters.201 Yet there are elements relating to shari’a that render it, on 
balance, fertile ground for a movement seeking to deny Muslims a place in 
the United States. Shari’a is relatively unknown, giving those seeking to char-
acterize it as a threat the opportunity to define it as they wish. In this regard, 
the foreign name helps to fortify a sense of menace, an outside presence 
threatening to disrupt the American way of life. The corpus of the shari’a 
was derived primarily in medieval times,202 by jurists with medieval world-
views. As such, it included some limited number of elements, among them 
harsh criminal punishments,203 which are easy to describe and, of course, dis-
tort. There are Muslims abroad who seem almost eager to help the Islam-
ophobic cause, making a spectacle out of such punishments.204 Finally, the 
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shari’a is the “way” for religious Muslims to live their lives,205 constituting 
the body of rules and norms they follow in carrying out their religious obli-
gations. Given these facts, it is easy to describe large numbers of Muslims, 
including American Muslims, as threatening because they claim to be de-
voted to shari’a, and to demonize shari’a as nothing more or less than the 
caricature its opponents have made of it. 
Under this highly reduced and broadly inaccurate conception of shari’a, 
gone are the primary rules of shari’a, which Muslims most often consider 
and which they rely on in their daily lives—those of worship and diet, includ-
ing how and when to pray, fast, give alms, and make a pilgrimage, or what 
foods to eat and what to consider sinful.206 Instead, for example, one pro-
posed legislative text seeking to deny Muslims status in the United States 
stated that the shari’a is not the “way” for Muslims, but rather a “legal-
political-military doctrine.”207 Those who follow it are not “Muslims” but, 
cleverly, “sharia-adherent’s [sic],”208 as if there were a way to adhere to 
Islam that disregarded shari’a. The goal of shari’a adherents, as mandated 
by shari’a, is to “actively and passively support the replacement of America’s 
constitutional republic,”209 to abrogate, destroy and violate the constitution 
through violence and criminal activity,210 and to replace it with “the estab-
lishment of a political society based upon sharia [sic].”211 Little wonder that 
those who espouse such a view, among them Newt Gingrich, describe shari’a 
as “a mortal threat to the survival of freedom in the United States and the 
world as we know it.”212 
Given this background, the opposition to Islamic banking becomes 
clearer. It is part and parcel of opposition to shari’a, which is in and of itself 
an attempt to deny Islam and Muslims the same space afforded to other reli-
gious followers. Hence, Gingrich’s statement of shari’a as a mortal threat 
was made directly in reference to his opposition to Islamic finance.213 
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Alternative objections to Islamic finance, to the extent they are raised, 
are so implausible they only help to demonstrate the underlying motivation. 
Many, for example, have alleged Islamic finance is a vehicle for funding 
terrorists.214 To believe this one would have to think the instruments em-
ployed to conduct artifice in Islamic finance–by such global institutions such 
as HSBC, Citibank, and AIG215–are so enticing to terrorists that they would 
prefer them to other means of currency transfer, which routinely avoid any 
reporting requirements at all.216 More likely, the objection is not actually 
to Islamic finance, but rather to the supposed threat, terrorist or otherwise, 
posed by Islam and Muslims. 
Other fears respecting Islamic finance are even more bizarre but still en-
tirely consonant with the same fear of shari’a as contagion. Hence, there is 
the suggestion that Hassan Banna, the founder of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, promoted Islamic banking so Islamic banks might penetrate 
and overtake the conventional finance sector.217 Banna died in 1949.218 The 
first Islamic banks did not begin in earnest until the 1970s.219 There is no 
sensible connection between the two of them. 
More centrally, however, the irony of the claim is that it has matters 
entirely backwards. Islamic banks have done absolutely nothing to affect the 
manner in which the global economy operates. Rather than being the means 
to penetrate and overtake conventional finance, as Part II and this Part have 
shown, Islamic finance has conceded to the dominance of conventional 
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finance, much to the consternation of its own proponents.220 Or, put differ-
ently, Islamic banks and Islamic financial institutions have assimilated, 
violating their own rules in order to find a way to get along. 
We thus have a rather confusing phenomenon. Those who view shari’a 
as a foreign menace that may penetrate and overtake the United States resist 
those financial institutions that assimilate and accept, at every level including 
the semantic, the rules of conventional finance to the derogation of Islamic 
doctrine. When considered from the perspective of the underlying suspicions 
of Islamic finance as part of a Muslim threat, however, this is not so pecu-
liar. The doctrine pertaining to Islamic banking is no more relevant to the 
Islamophobic elements in American society than constitutional law doctrine 
was particularly important to General Counsel Baxter. The point is not legal 
and doctrinal consistency. The point, rather, is to portray the enemy, wherever 
found, as antithetical to what one holds dear, be it the Constitution, repub-
lican values or the American way of life, and to keep him there. 
There are numerous other examples, indeed there are websites whose sole 
purpose appears to expose the supposed dangers that arise from Islamic 
banks and Islamic finance.221 More instructive for purposes of this Article, 
however, might be an example of the means by which such Islamophobic 
elements seek to deploy U.S. legal doctrine in service of this broader aim of 
eradicating recognized Muslim space in America. To date, the most legally 
sophisticated attempt to restrict Islamic finance was in the case of Murray v. 
Geithner, and it was not terribly sophisticated.222 The issue concerned the 
marketing by the insurance giant AIG through its subsidiaries of an Islamic 
insurance product known as the takaful, from which AIG earned 0.022 per-
cent of its revenue in 2009.223 Formally, the basis of the suit was that the 
U.S. government violated the Establishment Clause when it offered AIG bail-
out funds pursuant to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) because 
of AIG’s investment.224 That is to say, the United States government impermis-
sibly advanced the religion of Islam by supporting AIG, which supported 
takaful, and indeed was earning twenty-two-thousandths of one percent of 
its revenue from it. 
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The Establishment Clause claim was weak, assuming the Plaintiff even 
had standing to raise it. As such, it was dismissed at both the District Court 
level on the grounds that funding AIG through TARP was not a violation of 
the Establishment Clause,225 and at the Sixth Circuit on the grounds that the 
Plaintiff lacked standing.226 On its own, this is not interesting. More inter-
esting is the worldview of the Plaintiff and his legal team, as revealed in the 
confounding and incoherent positions taken by them in the summary judg-
ment motion and on appeal. The positions clearly reveal the matter had al-
most nothing to do with religion-state entanglements or the niceties of Islamic 
finance doctrine.227 Instead, the real motivation for the suit stemmed from 
a desire to deny specific space for Muslim accommodation because of the 
threat that the opponents of Islamic finance believed Islam posed to the 
United States.228 
The doctrine was thus a distracting sideshow that the Plaintiff seemed 
to find rather inconvenient to deal with. A quick review of the legal terrain 
demonstrates why this is. Courts evaluate statutes for their constitutionality 
under the Establishment Clause pursuant to the familiar Lemon test, first 
articulated in the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman.229 Under that test, a statute 
must (1) have a secular purpose, (2) not have a primary effect of advancing 
or inhibiting religion and (3) not entangle the government excessively in 
religion.230 Unfortunately for Plaintiff, this test offered no real opportunity 
to examine Islamic finance on its own terms, as the test is designed to gauge 
legislation on the basis of its connection to religion rather than the substance 
of the religion to which it is so connected. 
As such, the Plaintiff did not even seem to try to satisfy the Lemon test. 
It would be quite difficult under any circumstances to show that the purpose 
of the TARP program funding, when applied to AIG, was somehow moti-
vated by an Islamic purpose, rather than to save the financial system from 
collapse. But surely a better effort could have been made than what the 
Plaintiff put forth. Plaintiff merely asserted “a reasonable observer would 
conclude that the government purchased AIG stock under the EESA with 
the purpose of advancing religion because ‘Defendants intended for AIG to 
use federal funding to support all of its activities, including [Islamic finance], 
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which Defendants favorably endorse.’”231 Surely such a cursory statement 
requires substantial elaboration to be remotely plausible. The contemporary 
media reports all related to a need to prevent major financial institutions from 
failing and causing a wider panic that would force the credit markets to seize. 
Islamic finance simply was not in the discourse. Yet, Plaintiff seemed will-
ing to rely on its cursory statement, and hence could not establish the first 
prong of the Lemon test.232 
Plaintiff seemed similarly uninterested in establishing the second prong 
of the test.233 One way to establish government aid to a private entity violates 
the “effects” prong of the Lemon test is to show the aid supports religious 
indoctrination.234 This of course requires religious indoctrination to exist in 
the first place, and then to show that the government’s aid somehow furthered 
that indoctrination.235 AIG is not a not-for-profit institution, such as a church 
or a parochial school.236 As such, it could, and did, offer evidence to dem-
onstrate it was not interested in religious messaging at all and that it did not 
deliver its products with religious instructions or indoctrination.237 Instead, its 
mission in delivering these products, which in the end account for a minis-
cule part of its revenue, was to earn greater profits from those who wished 
to purchase them, and it was uninterested in the religiosity and indeed the 
religious affiliation of its purchasers.238 
To this the Plaintiff offered only that Defendant’s claims were “over-
whelmingly contradicted by the undisputed evidence and warrant[] no fur-
ther response.”239 This is a rather unorthodox method of persuasion during 
summary judgment and prompted a rebuke from the District Court.240 
Similarly, Plaintiff did not seek to show that whatever government aid 
existed supported Islamic finance products. In fact, Plaintiff did not even try 
to demonstrate how much of AIG’s business was involved in the marketing 
of such products, or how much revenue it derived therefrom.241 For all of 
this, seemingly crucial to win an Establishment Clause claim, the Plaintiff 
supplied only cursory or conclusory statements as its “evidence.”242 
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Instead, Plaintiff’s evidence related solely to the supposed danger that 
Islam in general and Islamic finance in particular presented to the United 
States, and the extent to which it needed to be utterly exterminated.243 Ob-
viously, this is legally irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claim as a legal matter. Yet, of 
course, it was the entire point of the effort. 
 Hence, for example, the Plaintiff submitted as evidence all of the 
activities that the Treasury Department had engaged in, described previously 
in Part I, including attending, sponsoring, and hosting Islamic finance work-
shops and seminars, instituting a scholar in residence program, and posting an 
article on its website offering an overview of Islamic Finance.244 With one 
exception all of these activities preceded the initiation of the program.245 
For that reason alone, the District Court dismissed the evidence.246 
Plaintiff’s other evidence came in the form of expert testimony, which 
was not brought to prove relevant elements of Plaintiff’s claim, including that 
TARP had a religious purpose, Islamic financial products constituted per se 
indoctrination, they were a fundamentally important part of AIG’s business, 
or the government sought to support those products in particular when dis-
bursing TARP funds.247 Instead, Plaintiff’s experts had negative testimony 
about Islamic finance and the threats it presented by way of support for ter-
rorism and jihadism, but little as to what any of that had to do with AIG’s 
products or the government’s support for AIG through TARP.248 Neither 
the District Court nor the Circuit Court seemed to be interested in even dis-
cussing this testimony given its near total irrelevance.249 The notion that an 
Establishment Clause violation could be sustained based on how “bad” a 
religion is alleged to be is too ludicrous to be taken seriously. 
Even the Plaintiff’s standing claim, accepted at the District Court level 
but rejected on appeal, was more indicative of the culture warrior than one 
actually interested in winning the case. The Plaintiff’s articulated harm was 
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that he was a Marine veteran, a devout Catholic, and a taxpayer harmed by 
TARP’s bailout of AIG because this promotes “shari’a law.” Shari’a law, 
according to Plaintiff, is part of a “global jihadist war against the West and 
the United States” and “sends a message to Plaintiff, who is a [non-Muslim], 
that he is an outsider.”250 Whatever the merits of Plaintiff’s claims regarding 
standing, it is difficult to see how they have anything to do with his feelings 
of being an outsider in America on the basis of a U.S. government bailout 
of an insurance giant. 
In any event, the point is quite clear: this case was not really about the 
Establishment Clause. It was merely a convenient front for the culture war, 
a forum where those seeking to deny the Muslim her place in the United 
States could hope to show the threats posed by shari’a, and specifically in 
this context Islamic finance, were pervasive and deep-rooted in large public 
and private institutions. 
In sum, opposition to Islamic finance is merely opposition to Muslim ac-
commodation, in precisely the same way that rhetorical support for Islamic 
finance is a form of expressed support for Muslim accommodation, notwith-
standing its absolute impossibility. 
CONCLUSION: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL ISLAMIC FINANCE 
The focus of this Article relates to particular reasons an Islamic bank in 
the United States remains so broadly popular, notwithstanding its doctrinal 
impossibility. Yet from this narrative springs forth potential explanations 
for much broader paradoxes respecting the continued explosive growth of 
Islamic finance.251 My purpose is not to explore such considerations in depth 
in this concluding section, as doing so would require a separate article, which 
I hope to undertake in the future. Nevertheless, there is sufficient space here 
to identify particular themes from the spread of global Islamic finance for 
which there is an interesting parallel in the curious and simultaneous impos-
sibility of and desire for American Islamic banking that I have discussed in 
the preceding sections. 
Specifically, the strongest theoretical proponents of Islamic finance 
have long extolled its attentiveness to peculiarly Islamic notions of fairness 
and social justice in particularly strident language.252 Seemingly in broad 
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agreement on this principle, the primary criticisms of Islamic finance from 
academics,253 religious scholars,254 and Islamic finance insiders255 are that 
it all too often mimics conventional finance rather than establishes an econ-
omy based in social justice as intended.256 
To the extent this is true, it is also true that both within and beyond the 
industry, experts have long suggested Islamic finance is doomed ultimately 
to failure unless it were to improve its ways and achieve some measure of 
                                                                                                                         
economics, as well as the seminal intellectual contribution to the creation of an interest-free 
bank in Islam, makes the point repeatedly in his writings. See MUHAMMAD BAQIR AL-
SADR, IQTISADUNA 58–63 (World Org. for Islamic Services trans., rev. ed. 2009) (describ-
ing social justice as one of the cornerstones of Islamic economics); see also MUHAMMAD 
BAQIR AL-SADR, AL-BANK AL-LA RIBAWI FI AL-ISLAM 6–7 (1973) [hereinafter AL-BANK 
AL-LA RIBAWI FI AL-ISLAM] (referring to a form of distributive justice as being a principal 
objective of Islamic economics, and to the Islamic bank as being a key component of the 
economic system). The same can be said for the militant Sayyid Qutb, whose influence on 
radical Islamic movements remains vibrant. Bernard K. Freamon, Martyrdom, Suicide, and 
the Islamic Law of War: A Short Legal History, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 299, 348–50 
(2003). Finally, the highly influential Pakistani Islamist, Sayyid Abul a’la Maududi, describes 
taking interest in almost Marxist terms, suggesting it increases maldistributions of wealth and 
perpetuates class struggle. See SAYYID ABUL A’LA MAUDUDI, THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF 
MAN AND ITS ISLAMIC SOLUTION 27–31 (Islamic Publ’ns 2d ed. 1966). 
Nor is this perception limited to the revolutionary founders. Usmani, for example, repeats 
Maududi’s claim that the charging of interest leads to massive wealth disparities in contem-
porary Western societies. USMANI, supra note 34, at 11. Chapra states that a central objec-
tive of Islamic finance is to do justice, and that Islamic finance achieves this through both 
requiring that a financier share in the risk of loss of an underlying venture, and that the poor 
have reasonable access to financing. Chapra, supra note 34, at 9. See also Timur Kuran, 
On the Notion of Economic Justice in Contemporary Islamic Thought, 21 INT’L J. MIDDLE 
E. STUD. 171, 174 (1989) (noting the manner in which Islamic finance proponents ground 
the injunction against interest in a principle of fairness). 
253 El-Gamal, supra note 32, at 127; Hamoudi, supra note 4, at 94; Zaman & Asutay, 
supra note 32, at 74. 
254 In one notable example, in 2008, several dozen Deobandi scholars in Pakistan issued 
a collective fatwa against Islamic banking, at least partly on the grounds it did not hold to 
the principle of profit and loss sharing but instead relied on vehicles that mimic, to quote 
the fatwa, “precisely conventional banking.” Shoaib A. Ghias, Juristic Disagreement: 
The Collective Fatwa Against Islamic Banking in Pakistan, in CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC 
FINANCE: INNOVATIONS, APPLICATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES 103, 107–08 (Karen Hunt-
Ahmed, ed. 2012). This was a particular embarrassment to Usmani, who after all is a Deo-
bandi himself and whose prominent role in contemporary Islamic finance can scarcely be 
gainsaid. Id. 
255 Hasan, supra note 33, at 11 (describing theory and practice as topics of frequent dis-
cussion at conferences on Islamic finance). 
256 See Mehmet Asutay, Conceptualisation of the Second Best Solution in Overcoming 
the Social Failure of Islamic Banking and Finance: Examining the Overpowering of Homo-
Islamicus by HomoEconomicus, 15 IIUM J. ECON. & MGMT. 167, 172–73 (2007). 
152 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:105 
social justice rather than exclusively engaging in nonsensical formalistic con-
tortions to mimic conventional transactions.257 The assumption underlying 
such a prognostication is that Muslim consumers are not interested in Islamic 
finance because it provides some sort of substantively empty rhetorical ges-
ture while undertaking the economic and legal equivalent of conventional 
transactions. Rather, they are seeking an alternative economic paradigm be-
cause of broad dissatisfaction with the current global economic ordering and 
they expect Islamic finance to provide it.258 
Hence, with the unabated growth of Islamic finance, there is something 
of a paradox that arises again in the global sphere. This is because Islamic 
finance has hardly become more substantively distinct from conventional fi-
nance over the past several years, and there is much evidence that the exer-
cises in mimicry are increasing rather than the reverse.259 Yet at the same 
time, Islamic finance has exploded in size, from U.S. $5 billion in 1982260 to 
$200 billion in 2000,261 to $500 billion in 2008,262 to an estimated $1.8 tril-
lion by the end of 2013.263 If Islamic finance is supposed to represent a broad 
Muslim desire for an alternative economic arrangement,264 and if it is plainly 
not doing that, whether because doing so is economically impossible or for any 
other reason,265 then what explains the unimpeded growth of the industry? 
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Political considerations well beyond the narrow confines of legal and reli-
gious doctrine again provide the answer. These considerations have become 
particularly salient in the Muslim world over the past several decades, which 
has seen a rise in the political movements referred to as “Islamist,” meaning 
for these purposes that they seek a more robust role for the shari’a in public 
life.266 In many cases, governments that are not themselves Islamist will seek 
to invoke shari’a as a means to blunt the popularity of Islamist groups.267 For 
any such government, Islamic finance proves particularly useful as a means 
to demonstrate Islamic credentials without disrupting the existing political, 
economic, and social order. 
One of the premier states in which a secular government endorsed Islamic 
causes because of Islamist competition is Malaysia.268 Specifically, beginning 
in the 1970s, Malaysia’s premier party, the UMNO, “co-opted prominent 
Muslim leaders, created its own channels (and curtailed others) for Islamic 
renewal and proselytization ..., strengthened state-provided Islamic education, 
mandated Islamic rituals and discourse in public life, and bolstered Islamic 
institutions of all sorts, from banks to universities.”269 The UMNO took these 
steps at least in part because of the rise in popularity of an Islamist competi-
tor known as PAS.270 
The public support that has been devoted to Islamic finance as part of the 
broader Islamization effort is hard to overstate.271 It included measures such 
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as encouraging local religious leaders to develop Islamic financial products 
that resembled those of conventional finance, along with disapproval of and 
distaste for obsession with finer points of religious doctrine in a way that 
would inhibit the cause of Islamic finance.272 Government support also took 
the form of direct financial and administrative aid, including the subsidizing 
of research centers and universities to legitimize Islamic finance and Islamic 
capital markets and the creation of a national shari’a board that would deter-
mine which Islamic financial practices were permissible and which were not 
throughout the nation.273 The ultimate result of this broad and extensive sup-
port was the establishment and fostering of a parallel banking system in 
Malaysia that ran alongside the conventional financial sector,274 one that 
became a premier center for Islamic finance in the world.275 
The other major area in which Islamic finance tends to operate within the 
Muslim world is in the Arab Gulf, and specifically those nations that com-
prise the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).276 Here, again, the support offered 
to Islamic finance, derived ultimately from the extensive oil wealth in the 
region, began in the 1970s, precisely when criticism was on the rise respect-
ing the perceived decadent and squandering ways of the Arab oil sheikhs.277 
Saudi Arabia, a state that is “notoriously sensitive” to any accusations re-
specting its Islamic legitimacy, led the effort.278 Such accusations, after all, 
undermine the very political legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy, which relies 
on the support given to it by a deeply conservative religious establishment.279 
The other GCC states have Islamist movements of their own to contend 
with, making their support for Islamic finance as a means to blunt Islamist 
power equally sensible. The major political opposition force in Kuwait, for ex-
ample, is Islamist in its orientation.280 The United Arab Emirates is concerned 
enough about Islamist opposition as to hold show trials in order to send dozens 
of Islamists to prison, notwithstanding the predictable criticism this generates 
from prominent human rights groups.281 Qatar’s emir is notoriously adept 
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at using Islamism to bolster his own political legitimacy.282 Finally there is 
Bahrain, with its explosive combination of a Sunni monarchy and a Shi’a 
majority population,283 where a need by the leadership to legitimize itself 
given the circumstances is both patently urgent and blatantly obvious. 
Quite notably, however, Islamic finance and Islamic economics served, 
and continue to serve, the uses of the GCC states and Malaysia as a means to 
bolster Islamic credibility only if they are not truly revolutionary. In other 
words, where the founders of Islamic economics in the middle of the previous 
century advocated and agitated for political and economic revolution,284 the 
state benefactors of Islamic economics two decades later in the 1970s very 
much sought to transform that revolution into something altogether more 
compliant. Hence, they were as responsible for directing Islamic economics 
and Islamic finance as they were in supporting it. Saudi Arabia helped nar-
row the focus of Islamic economics,285 and Malaysia’s premier Mahathir 
Mohammad directed support to clerics and proponents who supported his 
own modernist ideas while curtailing dissenting voices.286 This trend did not 
alter the revolutionary rhetoric of Islamic finance as being a source of social 
justice and wealth redistribution,287 nor was it intended to. But quite plainly 
it altered the practice of Islamic finance, from one advocated by forces of 
revolution to what is now practiced by international financial giants such 
as Citibank288 and HSBC,289 both of which have Islamic finance desks. 
Having been so thoroughly compromised, it is hard to imagine Islamic fi-
nance poses any sort of threat to the prevailing political, social, and economic 
order that the GCC states and Malaysia seek to preserve. Of course, it also 
will not do much to help Muslim societies deal with their severe economic 
problems,290 but this was never the point of the support offered to it anyway. 
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The point was to demonstrate Islamicity while not forcing major economic or 
political disruption, and in this, Islamic finance has succeeded magnificently. 
Interestingly, the same factors will likely lead to broader support and ex-
pansion of Islamic finance in years to come. This is because, ironically, many 
political movements grounded in principles of religious conservatism find 
themselves in something of the same predicament as the ruling governments 
that have long sought to suppress them. Recently, for example, Islamist par-
ties have been able to lead governments following electoral victories, and in 
particular following the Arab Spring .291 The movements that have come to 
power in this way are hardly radical or revolutionary.292 In fact, they gener-
ally seek to downplay or ignore more radical manifestations of contempo-
rary shari’a implementation for fear that to advocate for such things would 
be electorally damaging.293 The movements thus insist they adhere to values 
of human rights, freedom of speech, democratic politics, the separation of 
powers, and equality under the law, irrespective of race, origin, gender, or 
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even creed.294 At the same time, of course, such parties are Islamist and need 
to demonstrate some deference to traditional understandings of the shari’a to 
appeal to their more conservative base supporters if nothing else.295 If they 
did nothing but speak of peaceful transfer of power through elections, su-
premacy of the law, and equality of all citizens under law, then there would 
be little to distinguish them from secular and liberal parties. 
As it did with the states of the GCC and Malaysia, a commitment to Is-
lamic finance fits the needs of Islamist parties perfectly. In its compliant and 
compromised form, support for Islamic finance is unlikely to alienate even 
the most hardened secularist, so long as the state does not go so far as to 
mandate it—an exceedingly unlikely and radical step for a moderate Islam-
ist movement to take.296 And, to satisfy religious conservatives, Islamic fi-
nance shows commitment to something that is at least rhetorically Islamic 
and sounds in the forms of classical Islamic jurisprudence.297 
Hence, Iraq’s highly divided legislature recently enacted a law forming 
its own state-chartered Islamic bank, the Islamic Bank of Mesopotamia, be-
cause Islamists  wanted to demonstrate a commitment to shari’a.298 For their 
part, secular groups thought it was pointless to object to the establishment of 
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a bank with a paid up capital of U.S. $43 million,299 a fraction of the size 
of Iraq’s two largest conventional banks.300 
Another salient example is Tunisia, where the ruling Islamist Ennahda 
party has repeatedly insisted that the imposition of shari’a is not part of its 
political program.301 Yet of course, Ennahda is an Islamist party, and it relies 
on support from a base that wishes to see a broader role for shari’a in public 
life. It could lose that base to more conservative elements if it disavowed 
shari’a entirely.302 Again, Islamic finance fits Ennahda’s purposes perfectly, 
a fact that became obvious when its Prime Minister announced in June of 
2012 an intention to make Tunisia a hub for Islamic finance.303 This broad 
effort has led most recently to a parliamentary vote to authorize a sovereign 
issuance of a form of Islamic bond known as the sukuk, thereby both en-
abling the state to encumber itself with potentially unpopular foreign debt 
while simultaneously advancing the cause of mild Islamic revivalism.304 
None of this demonstrates a lack of sincerity on the part of the many 
participants in global Islamic finance any more than the American Muslim, 
or the American federal regulator for that matter, is being insincere in ex-
pressing a desire to see more Islamic retail banking take place in the United 
States. For the most part, it is fair to assume that the participants want what 
they have expressed an interest in promoting, and are not cynically hiding 
ulterior motives. 
The point, rather, is that in examining what they want by way of Islamic 
finance globally, and American Islamic retail banking particularly, there lies 
exposed a fundamental doctrinal incoherence. No purely formal legal analysis 
can explain away that incoherence. To understand Islamic banking, we must 
look beyond the law. When we do that, and only when we do that, can we 
make any sense of the industry. 
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